



*The  
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## **ABOUT THE JOURNAL**

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The Delano is the student journal of Roosevelt University's chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, the national history honor society. The journal is named to honor Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Since 2001, the chapter has been publishing the journal twice a year. In the past, the chapter accepted research papers, book reviews, poetry, and reflections on visits to places of historical interest for submission. Non-members are welcome to submit work.

All submissions should be typed in Microsoft Word, version 97 or better. Submissions must have footnotes as outlined in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please submit a hard copy and the computer file to the faculty advisors. Also include a brief biographical sketch of yourself and include your name, address, e-mail and phone number.

## **CONTACT INFORMATION**

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Dr. Margaret Rung, faculty advisor  
AUD 650  
ROB600-A  
312-341-3724  
847-619-8550  
[mrung@roosevelt.edu](mailto:mrung@roosevelt.edu)

John Schmidt, editor and president  
Carjf@aol.com

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# Searchlight in China<sup>1</sup>

After the Communists, led by Mao Zedong, defeated the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, the United States government refused to recognize the Communist regime for many years, and there was a great deal of tension between the two nations. The United States backed the Chinese Nationalists during the Civil War, and the U.S. Navy even set up a blockade against the Communists on the mainland. When the Korean War broke out a few years after Mao's victory, the U.S. sided with South Korea while Communist China fought on the side of the North Koreans. And, during the Vietnam War, which raged into the 1970's, the Chinese supported the Communist revolution in that country, led by Ho Chi Minh, against the U.S. soldiers fighting with the South Vietnamese.

The diplomatic impasse between Communist China and the United States still existed when Richard Milhous Nixon took office as the thirty-seventh president of the United States in 1969. But the stage was soon set for a new and different relationship between the two countries as Nixon made history in 1972 by becoming the first U.S. president to set foot in Communist China, officially known as the People's Republic of China (PRC). This was a very important event in Peking, Washington, Moscow, Hanoi and Taipei. As Simon Fraser of BBC.com states, "Nixon's historic trip came

after years of hostility and mistrust between Washington and the People's Republic."<sup>2</sup>

How did Nixon, previously known as a staunch anti-communist, end up in Peking visiting Mao and other Communist Chinese leaders, and what did this mean for the rest of the world? These talks were the culmination of much secret planning by the two governments, and they came about because both countries recognized that their interests would be served by ending the diplomatic impasse between them. The Chinese and Soviet governments had become hostile toward one another. Nixon hoped to gain leverage with the Soviets in an effort to bring about détente. Nixon also wanted to bring about an end to the biggest thorn in his side, the war in Vietnam.

The secrecy of the planning of the exchange between China and the U.S. was crucial in several respects. Nixon did not want to lose support at home through premature disclosure of the overtures toward the PRC. Furthermore, China and the United States both hoped to surprise the Soviets. President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger used secrecy to help achieve many of their foreign policy goals, the most important being the opening of the PRC to the western world. This essay will show that the restoration of diplomatic contact between China by the U.S. was important to both countries for different reasons, and it could only have been achieved through the use of secrecy, which was a favorite foreign policy tactic of Nixon and Kissinger.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Searchlight was the code name given to President Richard M. Nixon by the Secret Service during his tenure in office. David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 64.

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<sup>2</sup> Simon Fraser, "Flashback: Nixon in China," <<http://www.bbc.com>>, 20 February, 2002, online article, 1

<sup>3</sup> Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 89.

With the opening of these talks, the PRC hoped to gain two major international goals. First, Mao's Communist regime wanted the U.S. and the rest of the world to recognize it as the only legitimate government of China.<sup>4</sup> The Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, were recognized by many nations and by the United Nations as the official government of China though they were confined to the island of Taiwan. Second, the Chinese Communists wanted to show the Soviets that the U.S.S.R. was not the only communist superpower.<sup>5</sup> The relationship between China and the Soviet Union had deteriorated since the 1950's. China sought to be considered an equal to the Soviet Union among communist nations, but Stalin denied that the Chinese were equal to the Soviets.<sup>6</sup> During the Korean War, the Chinese and Soviets both assisted North Korea, with the Soviets supplying arms and the Chinese supplying men as well as machines. One of Mao's sons even died in the fighting. However, soon after the war ended, competition between the two nations became far more pronounced.<sup>7</sup> Because of the competition, the U.S.S.R. withdrew from China scientists who were working on a Chinese nuclear bomb and expelled the Chinese scientists from the U.S.S.R.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union also provided aid in 1959 to India during a border dispute with China, which helped to strain relations.<sup>9</sup>

There was also an ideological dispute between the two countries. The Chinese believed in spreading and

supporting violent communist revolutions against standing governments, while the Soviets believed in peaceful change through elections.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, China believed in autonomy for Communist nations, including itself, while the U.S.S.R. sought to dominate other Communist countries. Under the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union reserved the right to employ military intervention against Communist nations in its sphere of influence whenever the Soviet Union believed that there was a threat to Socialism in one of those nations. In August of 1968, Brezhnev sent tanks into Czechoslovakia because of liberal reforms instituted by the government of that nation.<sup>11</sup> The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had a great effect on the Chinese, and it caused them to look towards the west for protection against the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev Doctrine threatened China's autonomy, and this encouraged Mao to open talks with the United States.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, other disputes arose between China and the Soviet Union.

In 1969, China built up its military forces along the Sino-Soviet border, in part because of the Chinese government's belief that the border should be modified.<sup>13</sup> The Soviets responded by sending troops to the disputed area, and in March the two nations fought battles on the Ussari and Amur rivers.<sup>14</sup> Clearly, China and the Soviet Union were on poor terms, but China knew it could not defeat the U.S.S.R. in an all-out war.<sup>15</sup> Despite the long-standing hostility between the U.S. and the PRC, both sides

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<sup>4</sup> Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 171.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 1980), 134.

<sup>6</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 161.

<sup>7</sup> Nixon, *The Real War*, 135.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 136.

<sup>9</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 162.

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<sup>10</sup> Nixon, *The Real War*, 136.

<sup>11</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 162.

<sup>12</sup> Seyom Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.

<sup>13</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 162-163.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 162, 167.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 166-167.

realized there was a need to open the channels of communication.<sup>16</sup>

President Richard Nixon was an unlikely candidate for the job of resolving the diplomatic impasse between the United States and the PRC. Prior to his presidency, Nixon was a staunch anti-communist. He made a name for himself during the late 1940's and early 1950's by denouncing Communists and by leading the House Un-American Activities Committee investigation into allegations that Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. In regards to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Nixon said that he would not be prepared to change the "frozen attitude" the U.S. had toward China until that nation got rid of communism.<sup>17</sup> Nixon also stated in 1967 that the United Nations and other countries should not recognize Mao's regime or engage in trade with the PRC.<sup>18</sup> However, in his book, *The Real War*, Nixon states that one of his first ideas as president was to look towards opening China to the West.<sup>19</sup>

Why the sudden change? Nixon said, "It is in our interest to have a strong China, because a weak China invites aggression and increases the danger of war."<sup>20</sup> There were several other reasons that Nixon would want a favorable relationship with the PRC. Nixon hoped that improved relations between the nations could be used to gain leverage in negotiations with the Soviet Union and help persuade the Soviets to resume strategic arms limitation talks. Nixon also hoped to extricate the United States from the war in Vietnam, a war that had grown very unpopular by the time he took office. He felt that a better relationship with the PRC

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<sup>16</sup> Nixon, *The Real War*, 138.

<sup>17</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 160.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Nixon, *The Real War*, 137.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 302.

might help him to achieve this goal.

Additionally, U.S. foreign policy in most of Asia was having little success because of the Vietnam War, and the prospect existed that a better relationship with the PRC would reverse this trend.<sup>21</sup> David Gergen, one of Nixon's chief speechwriters, declared "...no one else on the American stage in the past 30 years, including Henry Kissinger, has demonstrated a deeper grasp of foreign affairs."<sup>22</sup>

Nixon's presidency came on the heels of an era of confrontation with communist nations, as illustrated by the Soviet capture of downed U-2 spy plane pilot Gary Powers, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Cuban missile crisis, and the war in Vietnam. Nixon wanted to open an "era of negotiation."<sup>23</sup> President Kennedy sent U.S. advisors into South Vietnam in 1961,<sup>24</sup> and U.S. involvement in the war then escalated rapidly under President Johnson. By the time Nixon took office, there were 530,000 American troops and over 200,000 American casualties in Vietnam.<sup>25</sup>

"The four years of the first Nixon Administration were marked simultaneously by White House efforts to reshape American foreign policy and by mounting domestic opposition to most of the legacies of that policy. Nixon realized that there was a linkage between resolving the Vietnam War and achieving détente, and he felt that China was the key to achieving these goals."<sup>26</sup> Kissinger believed that, instead of the bi-

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<sup>21</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 158.

<sup>22</sup> Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton*, 27-28.

<sup>23</sup> Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 10.

<sup>24</sup> Phillip Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 293.

<sup>25</sup> Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton*, 60.

<sup>26</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 5-6.

polar world that had existed since the end of World War II, there could be a “multi-polar” world, which would include China.<sup>27</sup> “What Nixon had primarily in mind was American diplomacy aimed at détente with the Soviet Union and an opening to mainland China.”<sup>28</sup> Nixon further hoped that détente with the Soviets and the opening of China would lead to the end of the war in Vietnam.

President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, began a strong friendship with each other, in large part because of the emphasis both men placed upon secrecy in conducting foreign affairs.<sup>29</sup> This obsession with secrecy played a prominent role in the foreign policy efforts of Nixon and Kissinger. Szulc states: “[Nixon’s] obsession with secrecy and his inclination towards deception led him to exclude most of the government from participating in policy formulation.”<sup>30</sup>

Shortly before Nixon was inaugurated as president he sent letters to world leaders such as Tito, DeGaulle, Ceausescu, and Brezhnev without informing his Secretary of State, William Rogers. These letters were the first covert foreign policy actions of the Nixon administration.<sup>31</sup> From this point on, Rogers and the State Department were left out of most important foreign policy matters that Nixon and Kissinger addressed; Kissinger admits as much in his memoirs, *White House Years*. Nixon never considered involving Rogers in the efforts to reach out to Communist China because Nixon did not wish to share the credit for this achievement with Rogers or the State Department.<sup>32</sup> Kissinger also took

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<sup>27</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 32.

<sup>28</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 373.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

<sup>32</sup> Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), 716.

control of National Security Council (NSC) meetings, and he reported directly to Nixon, thereby making it easier for Nixon to bypass the State Department on important foreign policy matters.<sup>33</sup> Throughout Nixon’s first term<sup>34</sup>, Rogers was left to perform “ceremonial acts” while Kissinger performed important tasks ordinarily undertaken by the Secretary of State such as meeting with foreign heads of state.<sup>35</sup>

Nixon’s obsession with secrecy was also illustrated by the fact that he sometimes had executive branch employees and members of the press corps wiretapped when he suspected that a leak had occurred.<sup>36</sup> This activity took place because of Nixon’s paranoia about people outside his inner circle of trust. Nixon’s paranoia ultimately helped lead to the Watergate scandal, which caused Nixon’s downfall.

Nixon’s obsession with secrecy went far beyond bypassing his Secretary of State on important foreign policy matters and spying on executive branch workers. President Nixon used the CIA to perform domestic operations, which were outside of the scope of the CIA’s proper role, including operations aimed at anti-Vietnam War rallies and demonstrations within the United States.<sup>37</sup> Nixon also used the CIA to assist a 1970 coup in Cambodia that toppled Prince Sihanouk, who had been supported by the Soviets.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, secrecy was used with respect to operations that widened the scope of the war in Southeast Asia, including military operations that began in Laos in 1971 and were not disclosed to the American public.<sup>39</sup> The CIA was also

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<sup>33</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 12.

<sup>34</sup> Kissinger became Secretary of State during Nixon’s second term after Rogers resigned.

<sup>35</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 242.

<sup>39</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 166.

involved in helping to overthrow the socialist leader of Chile, Salvador Allende, who was the victim of a military coup in September 1973, and the American public had no knowledge of the CIA's involvement.<sup>40</sup>

Additionally, Kissinger went to Paris to conduct secret peace talks with representatives of North Vietnam in May and June of 1971.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, Kissinger was also working on the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Nixon had meetings with Brezhnev without anyone else's knowledge, though nothing important came out of these talks.<sup>42</sup> There were also secret meetings in July 1971 between U.S. and Chinese representatives that helped bring about Nixon's 1972 visit to mainland China.<sup>43</sup>

It appears that Nixon had wanted to open communications with the PRC from the beginning of his presidency. David Gergen states that Nixon talked of opening China during his vice-presidency under Eisenhower, and that Nixon also wrote an article in 1967 urging an opening of China.<sup>44</sup> After he was elected president, Nixon gave an address to Congress in which he spoke again of wanting to open communications with China.<sup>45</sup> Nixon may have been motivated in part by a desire to open Chinese markets to U.S. businesses before

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<sup>40</sup> Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, 139.

<sup>41</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 402.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 401.

<sup>44</sup> Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton*, 57.

<sup>45</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 35. In addition, throughout all of my research, I found that Michael Schaller, in his book *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, was the only person to conclude that China approached the US and not the other way around. Schaller, 166-168.

the Japanese moved in.<sup>46</sup> In November, 1969, the U.S. naval ships that had been guarding Taiwan since 1950 were sent back to base, and the State Department lifted travel and trade restrictions relating to mainland China that summer.<sup>47</sup> The easing of trade and travel restrictions was intended to entice the Chinese into talks and to help gain the American public's support for the idea of improving relations with the PRC.<sup>48</sup>

Secrecy was used from the beginning of the U.S.-China talks. The initial communications between these two superpowers were sent through secret middlemen, including the leaders of Romania, Pakistan, and France.<sup>49</sup> In 1971 a Pakistani messenger delivered an unsigned letter to Nixon that offered to allow a U.S. representative to visit China.<sup>50</sup> Nixon and Kissinger agreed that Kissinger would undertake the trip as the secret U.S. envoy to take part in meetings with PRC officials.<sup>51</sup> Kissinger's trip to China was a closely guarded secret.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996* (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), 265.

<sup>47</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 33-34.

<sup>48</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 165.

<sup>49</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 33.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 36.

<sup>51</sup> Kissinger stated in *White House Years* that he was not the first choice to go to China. He and Nixon considered George H.W. Bush, Nelson Rockefeller with Al Haig, Eliot Richardson, and David Bruce before finally settling on Kissinger. Kissinger also stated that the main reason he was chosen was because he knew Nixon the best and would serve him closest to Nixon's preferences. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 715-717.

<sup>52</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 36.

In April 1971 the U.S. State Department sent out a memorandum stating, among other things, that the Chinese table tennis team was participating in a tournament in Japan in which the U.S. team was also participating.<sup>53</sup> At first, this information did not seem important, but, as Kissinger said, “[f]ive days later we all grasped the significance of this sentence.”<sup>54</sup> Kissinger stated that the Chinese team was sent to the tournament in an effort to reach out to United States by establishing friendly contact with its table tennis team. Strides in this direction were made on April 4 after a U.S. team member approached the Chinese team and asked for a ride on its bus.<sup>55</sup> Two days later, the American team was invited by the Chinese team to visit China, probably at the behest of Chou En-Lai.<sup>56</sup>

Soon after the American team returned from mainland China, the Chinese team returned the favor and visited the United States.<sup>57</sup> Thanks to Chou’s “stage management,” said Kissinger, the trip to China by the U.S. table tennis team was a success in bringing the two nations closer.<sup>58</sup> After the ping-pong team exchanges, students, teachers and journalists were allowed and encouraged to go to China in cultural exchanges.<sup>59</sup> Nixon sent Kissinger to China in the midst of these cultural exchanges.<sup>60</sup>

Kissinger’s journey to China was set for July 8, 1971, while he was in the middle of a trip to Pakistan. The proximity of Pakistan and China enabled Kissinger to slip

away to Pakistan in the midst of this trip, after he faked a stomach illness.<sup>61</sup> The Pakistani Foreign Minister covered Kissinger’s absence so well that he actually had a banquet planned for ninety people, and had food prepared for them despite knowing that the banquet would be canceled when Kissinger faked his illness.<sup>62</sup>

The Chinese agreed to keep silent about Kissinger’s 1971 visit to Peking.<sup>63</sup> This concealment was essential so that Nixon and the Chinese could achieve surprise, especially with regard to the Soviets, in the event the visit led to a subsequent visit to China by Nixon. Premier Chou told Kissinger during this visit that, before the overt talks with Nixon could begin, the U.S. had to agree that Taiwan was a part of a single Chinese state, cut off trade with Taiwan, and remove its troops from that island. Kissinger agreed to do these things only because Chou did not set a specific deadline. The U.S. also wanted to be sure that subsequent talks would go forward before agreeing to end relations with Taiwan. The PRC requested U.S. support in its bid to gain recognition from the United Nations, but Kissinger would not agree to this.<sup>64</sup> During these negotiations, Kissinger was surprised that the Chinese only asked for a removal of troops from Taiwan, and not the entire Pacific, although the Chinese probably felt that the removal of U.S. troops from the entire region would benefit the Soviets.<sup>65</sup>

After Kissinger returned to the U.S., he met with Nixon on July 14, 1971 to discuss his meetings with Chinese officials. Secretary of State Rogers was allowed into

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<sup>53</sup> Kissinger, *White House Years*, 708.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 709.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 399.

<sup>58</sup> Kissinger, *White House Years*, 710.

<sup>59</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 170.

<sup>60</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 36.

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<sup>61</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 171.

<sup>62</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 406.

<sup>63</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 36-37.

<sup>64</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 411.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 412.

the meeting only when they had finished discussing China and begun talking about the Vietnam War.<sup>66</sup> The following day President Nixon “stunned the world by going on television to announce that Henry Kissinger had just returned from a week-long visit to China,” and that Nixon had accepted an invitation to visit mainland China in February 1972.<sup>67</sup> This announcement shocked most Americans because they were unaware of Kissinger’s trip. Tad Szulc states that the Chinese may or may not have known about Nixon’s plans to visit the U.S.S.R. soon after going to China in February, but the talks with China most likely helped Nixon get more out of the SALT and détente talks with the Soviets.<sup>68</sup>

On October 25, 1971 the United Nations decided to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China, which was an important step for the PRC and a severe blow to the Nationalists.<sup>69</sup> Immediately after announcing that he would visit China, Nixon began preparing for the trip. Nixon practiced Chinese etiquette, he extensively studied matters involving Taiwan and the Soviet Union with Kissinger, and he also sent people to China with television equipment to record his arrival.<sup>70</sup>

On February 21, 1972, President Nixon’s landing in Peking was broadcast to a live prime time television audience back in the U.S.<sup>71</sup> Nixon made sure that he shook hands with Premier Chou, whom John Foster Dulles had snubbed in 1954. This was an important gesture designed to show

that the previous hostility between the two governments was a thing of the past.

The landing itself was not a great affair, as Chairman Mao was not present. There were some Chinese troops on the scene, and the national anthems of both nations were played while their flags flew.<sup>72</sup> Chairman Mao appeared at Nixon and Kissinger’s first meeting with Chou. They only talked for about an hour (half of which was taken up by translation), and the issues they discussed included Taiwan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and further U.S.-China talks. Kissinger said that he later realized that Mao was outlining the Shanghai Communiqué, which became the official document of the talks. Rogers, though included on the trip, was left out of this meeting as the Chinese had stated that they only wanted to talk to the “real principals” of the U.S. team.<sup>73</sup>

The evening that Nixon, Kissinger and the rest of the U.S. group landed in China, a banquet was held in celebration of the momentous event. During this banquet, also broadcast across the ocean to the American public, Nixon gave a speech applauding improved U.S.-China relations, and he imbibed with the guests in attendance.<sup>74</sup> During the next four days, the actual talks took place. Most of them were held in private, with Nixon and Chou involved. Kissinger and China’s top diplomat Chao did additional work on the points that Nixon and Chou agreed upon, while Rogers essentially engaged in busy work.<sup>75</sup> Kissinger worked extremely hard on the negotiations, laboring privately throughout the night with Chou and Chao. The talks culminated in the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué, which generally outlined the future of the burgeoning

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 415.

<sup>67</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 171-172.

<sup>68</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 414.

<sup>69</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 38.

<sup>70</sup> Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1974), 267-268.

<sup>71</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 516-517.

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<sup>72</sup> Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 267.

<sup>73</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 516.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 518-519.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 520.

relationship between the United States and the PRC.<sup>76</sup>

A major obstacle remained, however, because the two nations could not work out an agreement on the Taiwan question. The PRC wanted the Americans to immediately break off relations with the Nationalists but Kissinger said that the U.S. could not do this for an undetermined amount of time. To get around this obstacle, Nixon and Chou agreed to make the Shanghai Communiqué a two-part document, with one part relating to the PRC and its view of the talks and the other part relating to the American view.<sup>77</sup> In the end, "...the Peking trip was marked more by correctness than cordiality."<sup>78</sup> The negotiations did not result in any concrete agreements between the two countries; instead they set the stage for future improvements in their relationship.<sup>79</sup> Before parting ways, the representatives of the two countries planned to have Kissinger make a return trip to China for further negotiations.<sup>80</sup>

In the communiqué, China expressed support for the revolutionary communists in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, but it did not discuss the U.S. role in the wars in Southeast Asia.<sup>81</sup> Regarding Taiwan, the U.S. portion of the communiqué stated that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Taiwan once the U.S. was no longer involved in the Vietnam War.<sup>82</sup> The PRC did not back down to the U.S. during the negotiations, and it therefore achieved its basic goals. U.S. military forces would eventually leave Taiwan, but they would not withdraw completely from the Pacific region. The meetings opened up the prospect of amicable relations between the

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 519.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 520.

<sup>78</sup> Jones, 30.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 526.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 523.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 525.

United States and the PRC, and the Soviets were aware of this. Additionally, it appears that Kissinger also offered to share information with Mao's regime about the Soviet Union, including information about the Soviet military and nuclear weapons. It was hoped that such cooperation would push the Soviets toward détente with the Americans, but it appears that the Chinese did not accept the information offered by the Americans.<sup>83</sup> After returning to the United States, Nixon stated that the U.S. would recognize one Chinese state, but it would not "give up" on Taiwan for the time being.<sup>84</sup>

Nixon's visit to mainland China had some positive results for the United States as well.<sup>85</sup> The trip helped bring about the U.S.-Soviet talks that took place soon after Nixon's return from China. The trip to China "gave major impetus to the rapid elaboration of the US-Soviet détente relationship in the early 1970's."<sup>86</sup> After Nixon and Kissinger showed the world that they were willing to work with Mao's regime, Soviet leaders realized that they needed to explore serious negotiations with the Americans as well. In May 1972 Nixon traveled to Moscow, becoming the first U.S. president to enter the U.S.S.R. since Roosevelt met with Stalin and Churchill in Yalta. While he was vice-president, Nixon

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<sup>83</sup> "Kissinger Played China Overtures," [BBC.com](http://www.bbc.com), 10 January, 1999, online article, 1-2.

<sup>84</sup> Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 525.

<sup>85</sup> In John Starr's article "China and the New Open Door," he states that China was working with the U.S. to ensure that the Americans would not cooperate with the Soviets if they invaded China. John Starr, "China and the New Open Door," in *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, ed. Alan M Jones, Jr. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973), 81. This appears not to be true; the Chinese were in fact using the Americans to deter an invasion by the Soviets because of the new US-China relationship.

<sup>86</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 31.

had traveled to the Soviet Union to meet with Nikita Khrushchev, and the so-called “kitchen debate” had taken place.

The U.S.-Soviet talks proved to be beneficial to both governments. The two countries negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) to help reduce the nuclear arms buildup. This treaty put a cap on the number of anti-ballistic missiles for both nations.<sup>87</sup> The talks also helped the U.S. with the war in Vietnam. After the negotiations ended, Soviet support for North Vietnam diminished, although it was not completely cut off.<sup>88</sup> The U.S. and U.S.S.R. also began joint space projects and cancer research, both of which stemmed from the talks in May 1972.<sup>89</sup> Additionally, Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to improvements in the so-called “hot line” telephone, which connected the two leaders directly in case of emergency.<sup>90</sup>

Because it had improved its relationship with the United States, China had less to fear from the Soviets. Furthermore, it was important to the PRC that Nixon had endorsed the concept of a single China. The United States gained leverage with the Soviets, leading to the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, and it also gained the assistance of the PRC and the Soviets in extricating the U.S. from Vietnam. The Paris Peace accords formally ending the war were signed on January 13, 1973.

In 1973 and 1974, the Chinese bought \$900 million worth of grain from the

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<sup>87</sup> LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996*, 268-270.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 270. There is the argument in Jones’ article “Nixon and the World” that neither side would speak about Vietnam and the Soviets would not back down in supporting the North Vietnamese, however, LaFeber states the case the other way, and I am inclined to support his view because it is more recent and has the benefit of time and more research.

<sup>89</sup> Jones, 36.

<sup>90</sup> Brown, *The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years*, 37.

United States, but trade between these nations soon declined because other nations began to improve relations and trade with Communist China.<sup>91</sup> By 1979, over one hundred countries had recognized Mao’s regime.<sup>92</sup>

Nixon did not return to China during his presidency, which was curtailed because of the Watergate scandal. Kissinger did not return to China either, although he remained as Secretary of State under President Gerald Ford. Kissinger did not return to China largely because the SALT talks with the Soviet Union began to heat up and China fell by the wayside.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger achieved a breakthrough of historic proportions when Nixon traveled to mainland China in 1972 and met with the leaders of Mao’s government. Placing the United States on a course that resulted in recognition of the PRC in 1979 is one of the great achievements of American diplomatic history.

Joshua Kerr  
MA Candidate  
History

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<sup>91</sup> Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 176.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, 173.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 177.

# Development Without Democracy: The Political, Economic, and Social Transformation of Vietnam

## Introduction

Can a Third World nation ultimately be recognized as developed without a Western-style democratic system of government? Can a Third World nation even be on the road to development if the state does not embrace democracy? Not only do many political scientists and scholars insist that Western-style democracy is the preferred form of government, many also assert that Western-style democracy is essential before a nation can be considered developed.

Vietnam is not yet a fully developed nation. Recent events and attempts at reforms do suggest, however, that the Southeast Asian state, the world's twelfth most populated, is on a road to development although it is not carrying the banner of democracy. While many suggest that Western-style democracy is necessary for a truly developed state, recent political, social, and economic changes in Vietnam could very well be the catalyst for revised definitions of development. These changes illustrate that the stability, viability, and strength of a nation may not depend on, or even result in, a democratic style of government.

Vietnam is still in the process of developing, and it certainly has a long way to go before it is considered a fully developed nation. Despite the absence of democracy, the component that so many believe is necessary for development, Vietnam could very well evolve into a politically, economically, and socially developed state.

## Is Democracy a Vital Component to Development?

In many political studies, an examination of historical events shapes the reasoning and justifications for current beliefs. Yet, when looking at the history of the world's governments, it is clear that democracy did not always have the widespread support that it does today. Nations emerging from post-Cold War Communism, scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Robert Dahl, and massive demonstrations such as those held Beijing in 1989 have all championed Western-style democracy. Of course, prior to widespread democracy, lands were ruled by kingdoms and other types of authoritarian regimes that committed acts of grossly inhumane proportions. But there were proponents of nondemocratic rule, claiming persistently that the masses were ill suited to participate in the governance of a state. And this view has not completely died out.

Many analysts, especially modernization theorists who hold the belief that a fully developed nation must have the component of democracy, argue that political development is complete only with the inclusion of a style of democracy modeled after Western nations. Other analysts, realizing the ideological and cultural biases inherent in theorizing about development, have established different standards for political development, which will be outlined later in this essay. However, the consensus among scholars is that democracy must be included in the process of development. This concurrence has been formed from the spectre of widespread government abuses throughout the Third World. These abuses, ranging from repression of the citizenry to government unaccountability, preclude any kind of social equity; thus, it is held that democracy is necessary to prevent such abuses.

Obviously, there are volumes of works that define and analyze the precise meanings of democracy, and it is not the intent of this essay to highlight those definitions. To avoid potential confusion that could arise from the varying definitions of the word, the term *democracy* will be used in this essay as it is defined within the Western parameters, which include: periodic and legitimate elections, a secure legal system, universal suffrage, government accountability, individual rights, freedom of expression and association, and the protection of minorities.<sup>1</sup>

Among the reasons given for the necessity of democracy in a developed or developing nation are: avoidance of tyranny, a guarantee of fundamental rights (such as freedom of speech), general freedom, the fostering of human development, a chance at political equality, a higher likelihood of peace, and the empirical evidence that shows that democratic states are typically more prosperous than nondemocratic states.<sup>2</sup>

Scholars recognize, however, the unrealistic expectations and cultural factors that can come into play with the immediate introduction of democracy in fledgling states. Arguments have been put forth that democracy should perhaps take a secondary role while political stability is fostered. Many agree that a pre-democratic form of government, such as military rule or an authoritarian regime may be appropriate for a time.<sup>3</sup> For example, in Ghana during the early 1980's, the military regime of Jerry

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<sup>1</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 38; Howard Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 28-29; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Democracy As A Starting Point," *Journal of Democracy* 12.1 (2001): 9-10.

<sup>2</sup> Dahl, *On Democracy*, 45-60; Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 11.

Rawlings took control amidst corruption, economic instability, and social discontent. At first, Rawlings outlawed any type of opposing political parties in order to create a stability that he felt was needed in order for Ghana to be functional. After eleven years, Rawlings took Ghana through a "guided democratization," instituting "democratization from above," and then made attempts to institute democracy in the political realm.<sup>4</sup>

Conclusions that a Western-style democratic government is necessary for the political, economic, and social development of a nation are without validity, and further, underestimate the capacity and the will of a state. The arguments in favor of democracy as a component to development seem to be directed into one route; the analysts seem to have their compasses pointing to, at the very least, democracy over the long term. Yet, while there is widespread agreement that democracy is favored over military rule or authoritarianism, and a paradigm exists that suggests democratic states are more "fully" developed, indicators show that Vietnam is advancing toward development and stability without the presence of a Western-style democracy.

### **The Beginnings of Development in Vietnam**

In 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was formed following the Vietnam War and the reunification of the North and South states. Vietnam is one of only five Communist-led governments remaining in the world, the others being China, Cuba, Laos, and North Korea. However, in 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) adopted as national policy the idea of "renovation," a package grounded in market reform and price incentives.

As a nation that had experienced colonial rule and a devastating war in the

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<sup>4</sup> Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000), 277.

twentieth century, Vietnam chose to seek development without democracy. After the withdrawal of American troops in 1975, Communist forces from North Vietnam seized control of Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital. After initially integrating the political structure of the North into the South, the VCP began the drive to build a socialist society. A number of crises stalled the progress that the VCP had hoped to make: resistance by Southern farmers toward collectivization, natural disasters in the late 1970's, and economic mismanagement. Further, problematic relations with Cambodia and China, and the fleeing of many Vietnamese citizens compounded the crisis.

Due to the Communist nature of its government, Vietnam was also subjected to trade embargoes from many states that had supported the South during the Vietnam War. This led to dependence on the Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist states. At the same time that dependence on the outside was increasing, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, leading to a war with China, Cambodia's closest ally. Chinese forces devastated the northern region of Vietnam. These crises soon led to calls for change.

Even within the VCP, members began pushing for reform, only to meet resistance from conservatives within the party. As a result, the VCP did not finally endorse "renovation" as Vietnam's national policy until 1986. Since that time, Vietnam has made efforts to develop "a market economy with a socialist orientation under the direction of the state."<sup>5</sup> Further, the VCP's renovation program has implemented a degree of political liberalization, as well as focusing on advances of favorable social conditions.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2001 ed., s.v. "Vietnam."

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

### **Indicators of Political Development**

Without taking democracy into account, many political scientists cite specialized and differentiated government institutions that carry out necessary functions such as national defense, collection of tax revenues, oversight of the economy, and the desire and will to improve the quality of human life as evidence of political development. Additionally, these political scientists believe that a politically developed state must have the elements of governmental responsiveness to its citizens, a consideration for fundamental freedoms and civil rights, and some form of a welfare state.<sup>7</sup>

Defining political development has been problematic due to concerns about ideological and cultural biases and anxiety over whether Western-style democracy should be included in the definition of development.<sup>8</sup> More specifically, there are three dangers to defining political development. The first is the assumption that industrialized states are inherently more politically developed. History has shown that what may be considered an advanced stage of political development could actually be surpassed by societies that are more backward in other respects. For example, decentralized states such as Britain and Japan have advanced industrially, but the more centralized governments of France and China are actually more politically complex. The second is the assumption that a politically developed state possesses a moral superiority. And the third is the assumption that development eventually ceases due to total political development. In other words, when does a state finally cease developing?<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 10-11.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 10

<sup>9</sup> *Oxford*, s.v. "Political Development."

## **Political Development in Vietnam**

In an analysis of political development in Vietnam it is critical to recognize that the nation is still developing. It is easy and simplistic to blame the woes of Vietnam on the lack of democracy. The Vietnamese Communist Party's role is constitutionally mandated, and the party is run by a sophisticated system of leadership and bureaucracy. Although requiring unanimous consent of the VCP in making policy and governmental decisions may seem inefficient and cumbersome, it is wise to remember that the highly admired divided form of government of the United States, with its sophisticated structures of bureaucracy and "checks and balances" leads to inefficiency as well. Yet, the United States government is considered a highly developed political system.

Further, the VCP is in the midst of changing from within. As younger members join the party and assume roles in government, they have an influence on the direction of the state. They understand the realities of globalization, seeing the need for integration into the new global economy.<sup>10</sup>

One of the elements of political development is the state concern for its economic well being. Often, however, the first step to economic and social development is the stability of the government. With "renovation" as its national policy, Vietnam is taking steps to achieve political stability. In fact, some say the government is actually overcautious in this regard, sometimes forsaking economic and social advances in order first to stabilize politically.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Andrew J. Pierre, "Vietnam's Contradictions," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (November/December 2000): 72-73.

<sup>11</sup> Serge Berthier, "Is There A Leader in Vietnam?" (Spring 2001) [journal on-line]; available from *Asian Affairs*, <<http://www.asian-affairs.com/edito/editovietnam.html>> (accessed 17 February 2003).

Yet, despite concerns of economic over-caution to achieve political stability, the Vietnamese government has also begun to take advantage of the benefits of globalization. Vietnam began to emerge from isolation to a reorientation toward foreign relations after it signed a peace agreement with Cambodia and the Soviet Union collapsed. As a result, foreign investment grew, relations with the United States were normalized, and Vietnam became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional economic organization.<sup>12</sup>

Although political dissent is dealt with in a manner that is at the very least undemocratic, Vietnam has made political reforms that show evidence of its growth and complexity. Grassroots organizations have formed and have been able to influence government at a local level. These groups have successfully lobbied for government contributions of public money to restoration projects. Additionally, groups with agendas different from the state have had their voices heard, signaling that the state has loosened its grip on exclusive control over society.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, recognizing the need to improve the lives of its citizens, Vietnam embarked on a program to develop a more accountable and responsive public administration. The government has been approved for a \$45 million loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to help implement a program that will include training, systems modernizing, and policy coordination.

John Samy of the ADB's Vietnam Resident Mission stresses that increased openness and accountability will make

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<sup>12</sup> *Oxford*, s.v. "Vietnam."

<sup>13</sup> Shaun Kingsley Malarney, "Culture, Virtue, and Political Transformation in Contemporary Northern Vietnam," *Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 4 (November 1997): 915.

Vietnam more attractive for foreign trade and investment. Further, a more open public administration will be in a better position to respond to the needs of a population expecting and deserving of “greater participation, transparency, and accountability from its public servants.”<sup>14</sup>

Poorly managed state enterprises have drained already scarce government resources and a lack of flexibility and transparency is seen as incompatible with the rapidly growing and integrating world economy. These problems may be resolved by the injection of cash from the ADB.<sup>15</sup>

### **Indicators of Economic Development**

Although economic development is commonly thought to be related to political development, it is important to understand the distinction between the two. For example, Costa Rica and Trinidad, while politically developed, still have not been able to fully realize the potential of economic development.<sup>16</sup>

The debate over what constitutes political development does not carry over to the question of what defines economic development. The prevalent indicators of economic development are clear. These indicators are better defined likely because of the presence of institutions that have sought to understand and assist not only Third World nations, but also other nations in need of economic assistance.

A leading indicator of economic development is income disparity among countries, which is measured by per-capita

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<sup>14</sup> Asian Development Bank, “Fostering a More Modern, Accountable Public Administration in Vietnam,” *ADB.org* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2003/nr200309.asp>; accessed 17 February 2003.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 3.

income.<sup>17</sup> This indicator reveals the widespread poverty in the Third World, which has resulted in unemployment, poor housing conditions, poor health, and general urban blight.<sup>18</sup>

Another indicator of economic development is income disparity *within* the country. To the uninitiated, an economically underdeveloped country may bring forth images of vast poverty, yet many developing countries have vast amounts of wealth, but that wealth is concentrated within a small fraction of the population. Visions of Third World countries with “sparkling skyscrapers and luxuriant suburbs” within range of “open sewers (and) contaminated drinking water” characterize the extreme uneven distribution of wealth.<sup>19</sup>

The importance of a large middle class in creating political and societal stability is underlined by its sheer absence in certain instances. When a state has a tiny amount of the population in control of a disproportionate amount of the national wealth, a common result is an uprising leading to a change in government, often with undesirable results. A more equitable distribution, while creating economic classes, provides a more settled, stable nation.

Finally, another marker of economic development is the matter of gender. Women comprise 59 percent of those living in poverty in developing countries although they only make up 39 percent of the total wage earners. Further compounding the problem is that women make up a high proportion of the “informal economy,”

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<sup>17</sup> Derived by the average dollar value of goods and service produced per person.

<sup>18</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 4-5; John T. O’Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2001), 428

<sup>19</sup> O’Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 428.

working for low wages as street vendors or as laborers within their homes, earning nothing at all.<sup>20</sup>

### **Economic Development in Vietnam**

The economic development of Vietnam has been a slow and painful process. However, this can be attributed partially to the general Asian economic downturn. Yet, strides have been taken by the VCP to ensure that the road to recovery is not blocked. As noted earlier, the VCP has been granted loans by the Asian Development Bank in order to facilitate steps toward accountability and modernization of systems.

The Vietnamese government has made steps toward economic liberalization, which will likely enhance growth and development. Amendments have been made to streamline restrictive regulations that have discouraged foreign investment, and the government has moved ahead with the United States – Vietnam trade agreement, opening normal trade relations between the two countries. Perhaps these changes will provide momentum for economic reform, and hasten the political development of the nation.<sup>21</sup>

How has the liberalization fared in the way of reducing poverty? According to two authoritative measurements, Vietnam is on the move toward economic improvement. According to the World Bank, poverty has been reduced in Vietnam over the last decade. The World Bank states that people with per-capita expenditures below the poverty line dropped from 58 percent to 37 percent -- *in only five years*. Further, there are indications that the very poorest have declined from 25 percent to 15 percent of the population during the same time period.

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<sup>20</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 125-126; O'Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 429.

<sup>21</sup> Pierre, "Vietnam's Contradictions," 80.

During that time, almost no other country recorded such a sharp decline in poverty.<sup>22</sup>

In addition, out of 89 developing countries measured for poverty<sup>23</sup> by the Human Development Report 2002, produced by the United Nations Development Programme, Vietnam ranks 43<sup>rd</sup>, and has moved up from 45<sup>th</sup> only a year prior to the report. In fact, the report points out that "Vietnam has done much more to translate its income into human development, while other countries with higher income fall behind in their Human Development Index."<sup>24</sup>

The literacy rate for women in Vietnam remains very high, which bodes well for economic improvement. Lower rates of poverty have decreased the incidence of discrimination against females, and gains in income levels have been reported as well. Although some types of inequality are reported to have increased in recent years, the opening of Vietnam to the international community may be reversing this.<sup>25</sup>

### **Indicators of Social Development**

The United Nations Development Programme has devised measures that have been widely accepted as indicators of social development. Known as the Human Development Index (HDI), this gauge

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<sup>22</sup> World Bank Group, "The World Bank and Vietnam," *World Bank Group* [home page on-line]; available from <http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf>; accessed 17 February 2003.

<sup>23</sup> The measurement includes the percentage of the population suffering from basic deprivations.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "UNDP Vietnam Media Release: Human Development Report 2002," *United Nations Development Programme* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.undp.org.vn/mlist/devln/072002/post45.htm> accessed 19 March 2003.

<sup>25</sup> Daniel Goodkind, "Rising Gender Inequality in Vietnam Since Reunification," *Pacific Affairs* 68, no. 3 (1995): 358-359.

measures such quality of life factors as life expectancy, adult literacy, and educational levels individually, then provides an overall measurement combining the factors. The higher the score, the more socially developed a country is considered. The latest report, published in 2002, measured 173 nations.<sup>26</sup>

Higher levels of social development, including a literate and healthy population contribute to higher labor productivity. In addition, an educated population contributes to a greater awareness of the political realm, thus advancing political development.<sup>27</sup> Other development indicators include school enrollment, the unemployment rate, access to basic social services, empowerment of women, preserving the culture of ethnic minorities, and ensuring environmental sustainability.

According to the measurements and empirical evidence, high social development tends to lessen human inequality. In other words, the higher the social development, the lower the severity of the inequality.

### **Social Development in Vietnam**

The Vietnamese government has progressed from a poor, backward country to one that has made significant steps in social achievements. The World Bank has outlined several key development targets, and with the support of the international community, the government has prepared strategies to meet those targets.

Reports indicate “sincere efforts and priority setting for social development,” and have noted “significant advancements in...the delivery of social services.”<sup>28</sup> But

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<sup>26</sup> “UNDP Media Release.”

<sup>27</sup> Handelman, *The Challenges of Third World Development*, 6.

<sup>28</sup> Tran Thi Que and To Xuan Phuc, “Social Development is a Priority,” *Social Watch* (2002), <[http://www.socwatch.org.uy/en/informeImpreso/pdfs/vietnam2002\\_eng.pdf](http://www.socwatch.org.uy/en/informeImpreso/pdfs/vietnam2002_eng.pdf)> (accessed 21 March 2003).

despite all of these efforts, the Vietnamese government has not traveled an easy road. Social development is a challenge even for some highly developed and industrialized states. Yet, Vietnam has made progress.

The HDI report ranks Vietnam 109<sup>th</sup>, out of 173 countries, placing it in the category of “medium developed countries.” Yet, the real story is the list of advancements that Vietnam has made in several categories. And, compared with other countries with similar GDP’s, Vietnam has outpaced many in the area of social development. The average life expectancy in Vietnam is now 68 years, surpassing Brazil’s 67 years. Literacy rates have climbed from 90.3 percent to 93.4 percent, surpassing Singapore, one of the so-called “Asian Tigers.”<sup>29</sup> Further, educational enrollment in primary schools is 94.8 percent.<sup>94</sup> Although Vietnam’s overall index score suggests a need for further improvement, many of the individual scores have increased significantly, giving hope for the advancement of social development. However, challenges continue, as they do for any nation trying to provide its citizens with a higher standard of living.

### **Development Without Democracy?**

It is quite clear that Vietnam has a formidable task in the upcoming years, if not decades. Over the last 30 years, this Southeast Asian nation has climbed out of the rubble of colonial subjugation and a devastating war. It has chosen a path that most political scientists, scholars, and analysts feel is a hindrance to full development. However, Vietnam has demonstrated capacity of a state – the ability

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<sup>29</sup> The “Asian Tigers” denotes a group of Asian nations that enjoyed spectacular economic growth from the 1970’s through the 1990’s.

<sup>94</sup> Tran Thi Que, 174-175; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2002.

and willingness to function as a legitimate entity.

In terms of political development, the Vietnamese Communist Party has made reform a state policy, has made inroads to further global relations, and has recognized the importance of political stability, even sometimes at the expense of economic and social development. Indeed, political stability is so much a concern, that strife within the VCP over allowing more local agenda setting has virtually shut down the Party.

Vietnam seems to be on the way to economic strength as well. The economic liberalization and easing of trade regulations evidence a maturity that a government intent on higher development certainly possesses. Efforts to educate the population and attempts to narrow the gender equality gap to a sliver are also signs of true progress. Following a period of focus on political stability, Vietnam can be more confident that a higher level of growth can be achieved and sustained.

The social development of Vietnam is encouraging, not only from a national perspective, but from a global perspective as well. And although the income gap has widened somewhat, it is still narrower than the democratic United States. Additionally, the Vietnamese government has overseen increases in literacy, and decreases in poverty. Vietnam's preparation and implementation of a strategy on sustainable development and prosperity shows a deep concern for the quality of life for its citizens.

Nowhere in this cautious, yet hopeful process is the supposed prerequisite of democracy. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam remains governed by a Communist leadership with no sign of democracy in sight. It has made substantial gains in political, economic, and social development that other, more democratic nations should admire. When touting the grandeur of

democracy as a model for all nations, political scientists, analysts, and scholars should consider the progress and development of the non-democratic state of Vietnam.

Bill Hammons  
B.A.in Political Science  
2003

## The Swastika And Its Origins

The final moments of Leni Riefenstahl's epic *Triumph of the Will* do not feature the image of Hitler, nor do they end dramatically with footage from a Nazi rally. The last frames of the film consist of the swastika, which begins as a small symbol on a flag and eventually overtakes the entire screen. While Ms. Riefenstahl may have used this technique to demonstrate the rise of National Socialism, the end of her film also makes it clear that the swastika is a powerful symbol. After the screen has gone black, the swastika lingers before the viewer's eyes, imprinted in the darkness like a stamp on a sheet of carbon paper. Hours after viewing the film, the swastika still haunts the mind because it is a reminder of the horrific crimes against humanity committed under the Nazi flag. The swastika is a symbol of racism, hatred, murder, and genocide.

Although most people associate the swastika solely with Nazism, the swastika was employed as a symbol long before the Nazi movement came into existence. The swastika is an ancient shape that was believed to bring good fortune to those who admired it. The symbol has existed for thousands of years, but has been associated with the evil of Nazism for less than a century. The goals of this essay are to reach past the embargo we have placed on the swastika to discover its origins in history, to find out when it became a symbol of Aryan bigotry, and to piece together the reasons why it was chosen by arguably the most reviled man in history to represent his modern reign of terror. This is the history of the swastika: a tainted symbol.

In 1894, Thomas Wilson published a book detailing the origins of the ancient symbol we recognize as the swastika.

According to Wilson, the swastika was prehistoric; it was found in India and Asia Minor during archeological digs in the nineteenth century. While Wilson acknowledged that the mythological swastika is believed to have been the unifying symbol of the Aryan race, he places more emphasis on the fact that it was also a symbol of Zeus, Baal, and almost every God of legend. It is a variation on Thor's hammer, which is relevant to our discussion because early occult factions in nineteenth century Germany used Thor as representation of the great Germanic tradition. Wilson does not allow the Aryans exclusive dominion over the swastika, however, as he is also careful to state that the swastika "appears in the footprints of Buddha, and is engraved upon the solid rock on the mountains of India."<sup>1</sup> In 1924, the swastika was found during an archeological dig in Indian ruins dating back to 3000B.C.<sup>2</sup> Wilson believed the symbol could have migrated from India to the West, as evidenced by the discovery of the swastika in western Turkey – the site of Homeric Troy.

Wilson also found evidence of the swastika's existence in North America, where American Indians used it as a symbol.<sup>3</sup> According to Wilson, this shows that the swastika was created by multiple cultures around the world in the pre-historic era. Current archeologists may argue with Wilson's assertion because the theory of a migration of peoples from Asia to North America via the Aleutian land bridge is now accepted by many. However, the swastika has been found in different forms and variations all over the globe; and it has had

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Wilson, *The Swastika: the Earliest Known Symbol and its Migrations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. National Museum [Smithsonian], 1894), 770-771.

<sup>2</sup> Steven Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?* (New York: Allworth Press, 2000), 29.

<sup>3</sup> Wilson, *The Swastika: the Earliest Known Symbol and its Migrations*, 982-83.

many different meanings regardless of its origins. The pure simplicity of the symbol would have allowed many primitive human beings the opportunity to use it and to assign a valuable meaning to it.<sup>4</sup>

In 1885, a German archeologist named Schliemann discovered the swastika at Hissarlik in Turkey - the ruins of ancient Troy. Once again, it appears the pure, aesthetic quality of the simple lines that form the swastika appealed to an entire civilization that used the mark to represent unity and good fortune. The word swastika means “well-being” in Sanskrit.<sup>5</sup> Prior to its use by the National Socialist party, the swastika was not the subversive symbol of modern crimes against humanity that it eventually became. In fact, the swastika was rather benign. The discovery of the symbol at Troy reignited the interest in the swastika by the advertising industry in America and Europe. It was featured on playing cards, fruit labels, cigar bands, business cards, and tin cans. In World War I, the American 45<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division wore swastikas on their uniforms to bring them luck, and because each of the swastika’s four “legs” represented one of the four states included in the Division. The Boy Scouts of America placed the swastika on their Badge of Fellowship, and the Girls’ Club of America sold swastika pins and published a monthly magazine called “The Swastika.”<sup>6</sup>

Because the swastika pre-dates the Christian cross, many organizations felt it was the safest object to use as an ornament. The sign is similar to the Hebrew letter *tau*, which means “sign of life.” In fact, on the floor of an ancient synagogue in Palestine, a swastika appears in the center of a mosaic

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<sup>4</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 20.

<sup>5</sup> Wilson, *The Swastika: the Earliest Known Symbol and its Migration*, 769.

<sup>6</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 82-90.

square clearly demonstrating that the swastika did not always represent anti-Semitic values.<sup>7</sup> Cultures all over the world had placed so many diverse meanings behind this symbol of good fortune, that the symbol had almost lost any meaning.<sup>8</sup> The benign quality of the swastika allowed groups to exploit the symbol and use it for their own purposes. However, because the true origins of the symbol are vague, it is also possible that it carried a meaning from generation to generation – an idea the occult Aryans would capitalize on.

The Nazis believed that the Aryans were light-skinned barbarians who migrated east to India carrying the swastika with them. According to W. Norman Brown, who wrote *The Swastika: A Study of the Nazi Claims of its Aryan Origin* in 1933, however, the swastika was in India before the Aryans arrived, so the Aryans could not have invented it.<sup>9</sup> In fact, Brown maintains that the Aryans did not even acquire the swastika until 1000 B.C. – some two thousand years after it was first used in India. The swastika was probably brought to the Indo-Europeans when the Hittites built their empire around that time.<sup>10</sup> This fact became distorted when the nineteenth century racists decided to make the swastika the Aryan symbol.

Heinrich Schliemann, the archeologist who discovered the swastika in Turkey was instrumental in bringing the swastika to the greater Aryan movement. Schliemann was most certainly Eurocentric, and he was a part of the early pro-Aryan minority in nineteenth century Germany. He had upset some of the German businessmen who financed his expeditions

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-9.

<sup>8</sup> Malcolm Quinn, *The Swastika: Constructing the Symbol* (London: Routledge, 1994), 59.

<sup>9</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 27-29.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

when he sided with the French in the Franco-Prussian War. Schliemann was eager to prove his loyalty to his Germanic heritage, and providing evidence that the swastika was an ancient Aryan symbol was Schliemann's way to return to the good graces of his investors. Schliemann was not necessarily anti-Semitic, and did not promote the swastika as a symbol of hatred.<sup>11</sup>

During this period, there was a great need for a unifying force in Germany. Marxism was a potential answer, albeit a temporary one, but it was not likely that Communism would bring the German states together under the imperial flag. Aryanism was the ultimate form of nationalism; the two countries that claim its origin – India and Germany – have both used the swastika as a racially unifying symbol.<sup>12</sup> Despite the scientific approach many archeologists took when researching the swastika, it was not long before mythology took over and the swastika became saturated with racism.

The end of the nineteenth century saw a rise in the *volkisch* movement in Germany. *Volk*, loosely translated, means folk. A race of people with similar characteristics, beliefs, and customs can be considered *volk*, or, in other words, a racial family. The *volkisch* movement invoked a spirit for the ancient German symbolism and mythology many Germans felt they had lost when the Germanic states united under one emperor. The swastika, along with other symbols like the rune, brought the German people back to a time when their culture was believed superior to others.<sup>13</sup> The symbols of the nineteenth century made German, mythology come alive.

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<sup>11</sup> Quinn, *The Swastika: Constructing the Symbol*, 33.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>13</sup> George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 71.

Because of its visual appeal, use of the swastika was an effective means of garnering mass support. The Star of David and the swastika both became popular at about the same time for similar reasons. These and other symbols were romantic, heroic, and artistic, and they recalled the intense rituals of ancestors who built civilizations with their bare hands. The nationalism that was growing throughout the nineteenth century in Europe helped bring about a return to symbolism in politics.<sup>14</sup> The masses associated a symbol with a mysterious mythology to make the mythology more real and to give it a contemporary meaning.

It cannot be determined with certainty exactly when the swastika became associated with anti-Semitism. While the archeologist Schliemann was not an anti-Semite, his partner Eugene Burnof was, and Burnof did not hesitate to proclaim that the swastika represented that form of hatred. Professor Friedrich Max Muller was a renowned anti-Semite who believed the swastika was destined to become Germany's emblem of world domination.<sup>15</sup>

The *volkisch* movement was anti-Semitic from its inception, and, in 1891, Ernst Ludwig Krause published a book that established the swastika as the true symbol of the *Volk*. Krause believed the swastika would help generate anti-Semitism throughout Europe. But some groups that used the swastika were not anti-Semitic. Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, a Russian-born medium who founded the Theosophical Society, placed the swastika on the official seal of the Society. And the Freemasons, a cultish group of builders, engineers, and craftsmen also used the

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<sup>14</sup> George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 7.

<sup>15</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 44.

swastika as their symbol. They had a number of Jewish members, and felt that the swastika was “a mark of Masonic importance,” not a symbol of Aryan greatness. The Freemasons were extinguished under the Nazi regime.<sup>16</sup>

Occult society in Germany became a testing ground for the swastika as a representation of race. Guido von List was a clairvoyant who told his followers he could validate Aryan mythology because he could see into the past. List held himself out to be an expert in the Teutonic language of Runes. In 1908, he wrote *The Secret of the Runes* for his List Society readers. He mentions the swastika – referring to it as the *fryfos* – even though there is no evidence the swastika existed in the Runic language. List said it represented the sun.<sup>17</sup> On the date of the summer solstice in 1875, List buried bottles in the shape of a swastika in the ruins of a Roman city in Austria. Hitler, a fan of List’s mystic anti-Semitism, supposedly wanted to excavate the ruins to find the buried symbol in the 1920’s.<sup>18</sup>

In 1900, J. Lanz von Liebenfels established the Order of the New Templar, which was an organization based in racial purity and racial breeding. He placed the swastika on his official flag, and flew it above his headquarters. This was the first known in which the swastika was employed as a racial mark. Von Liebenfels wanted to travel beyond Aryan domination; he wanted to renew the Teutonic Order and restore Germany to its medieval roots. Von Liebenfels was clear about his goals to cleanse Germany of the “Dark Ones,” meaning the Jews, the Slavs, and the Negroes, and raise a race of blond haired,

blue-eyed Aryans to take over the world.<sup>19</sup> In 1904, von Liebenfels published *Theozoology*, in which he stated that the Aryan race should enslave the “inferior races” so they cannot reproduce. He also lays out a plan for Aryan stud farms, which would later come to fruition thanks to the combined efforts of Hitler, Himmler, the SS, and hundreds of German women willing to be impregnated this way.

In 1905, von Liebenfels published *Ostara*, the first anti-Semitic journal in Germany. This journal stated repeatedly that a true Aryan would fit von Liebenfels’ characterization of a blond, strapping German who was capable of fighting a war, while rearing more Aryans at the same time. Hitler admired von Liebenfels so much that he employed some of his ideas in the Third Reich. However, *Ostara* – a journal Hitler read as a youth in Vienna – and other similar publications were banned in the Third Reich presumably so the population could not accuse Hitler of stealing his ideas from von Liebenfels and other anti-Semites. Steven Heller believed Hitler wanted to make the German public believe his plans were “immaculate conceptions.”<sup>20</sup> Both von Liebenfels and Guido von List were important in transforming racism into a cult-like religious fundamentalism. They raised the swastika up as a religious idol and attempted to make racism a religion, and they inspired Hitler to do the same.<sup>21</sup>

In 1912, a *volkisch* group was founded called the Germanen Order. The order consisted of anti-Semitic leaders and followers who believed that Jews were conspiring to take over Europe. They performed secret candlelight ceremonies,

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<sup>16</sup> Heller, *The Swastika Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 47-49.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 51-52.

<sup>18</sup> Quinn, *The Swastika: Constructing the Symbol*, 129.

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<sup>19</sup> Robert G. Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolph Hitler* (New York: Random House, 1977), 109-110.

<sup>20</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 55-56.

<sup>21</sup> George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978), 204-05.

and because of that, they earned a reputation of occultism. Starting in 1916, their newsletter, the *Allgemeine Orders-Nachrichte*, had a super-imposed swastika over a cross on its cover, and it became the Order's official symbol.<sup>22</sup> The Germanen Order prided itself on the fact that only pure Germans could be members; no mixed blood of any kind would be allowed. They hoped to spread this ideal throughout Germany.<sup>23</sup>

After World War I, marginal groups like the Order had the opportunity to blanket Germany with their anti-Semitic ideas. In Bavaria, the Order changed its name to the Thule Society and began to spread the "stab in the back" theory that the Jews had lost the war for Germany, and were engaged in profiteering in the Weimar Republic.<sup>24</sup> Thule gave itself a new symbol: a dagger super-imposed on a swastika. The swastika was on its way to infamy. Thule was popular with the right-wing because it was a reaction to Marxism; it was searching for its own violent way to overthrow their foes. Thule was the first society to use "Seig Heil!" as its greeting.

Von Liebenfels was influenced by the Thule Society to the extent the society was a political religion that subscribed to the *Fuhrerprinzip*, which means complete submission to the chosen Fuhrer, or leader. A working-class offshoot of Thule, the DAP, was still waiting for their Messiah-like Fuhrer in September of 1919 when Adolph Hitler attended his first meeting as a military spy. DAP later became the National Socialist German Worker's Party and the swastika became the party's symbol.<sup>25</sup> The Youth Movement throughout Germany also adopted the swastika as its symbol. Many

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<sup>22</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 56.

<sup>23</sup> Quinn, *The Swastika: Constructing the Symbol*, 130.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 129-130.

<sup>25</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 59.

young men in this movement felt cheated by the war because they had lost their fathers and brothers, and the nation now faced an economic depression. The Youth Movement was respected by many of the elderly in Germany who felt that the National Socialists possessed a vitality that would bring life to a defeated nation. The swastika became very popular with German youth after the war, causing the Prussian Ministry of Education to ban it from being worn in 1919 because it carried a stigma of anti-Semitic hatred, and, more important to the Republic, a *volkisch* sentimentality.<sup>26</sup>

Militant anti-Semitic armies that formed after the war also used the swastika. The *Freikorps* was a group of disgruntled veterans who made it their quest to punish the Jews, the Communists, and the Weimar Republic for allegedly losing their war. The *Freikorps*, along with the *Stalhelm* (Steel Helmet), used the swastika to represent the Fatherland – the idealistic Germany they would search for while bringing terror to innocent people. The *Freikorps* acted as an independent military and used a crude swastika on their uniforms and helmets.<sup>27</sup> While the *Freikorps* made the swastika a symbol of hatred and violence in Germany, another group would soon give the swastika far more notoriety as a symbol of hatred and violence.

When Adolph Hitler was a young man in Vienna, he had a friend named Kubizek, who later disputed Hitler's claim of being a dedicated student. Kubizek only saw Hitler reading two books; the first was a book for children about Norse Gods of mythology, and the second was a book about archeological findings of German tribes. One of these books had a swastika on the cover, and it could have been either book judging by the substance of the text. Kubizek said Hitler believed the swastika

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<sup>26</sup> Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 266-67.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-61.

represented “Germandom,” and it should be the ultimate symbol of the Aryan tribe. Hitler further believed that the swastika stood for racial purity.<sup>28</sup>

As a young man, Hitler envisioned writing a book that would become the Bible of his movement, and he envisioned a swastika on the cover.<sup>29</sup> Hitler was an aspiring artist, and he had an interest in mystical symbols. Therefore, it is somewhat natural that he was drawn to the swastika, which by the early twentieth century had become a symbol of things such as racial purity, world domination, and superiority of the Aryan race. Hitler eventually wrote *Mein Kampf*, while he was in prison for leading the so-called Beer Hall *Putsch*.<sup>30</sup> By this time, Hitler had become a leader in the National Socialist party, and it is apparent that he had mapped out many details concerning his political future.

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler reflected on how and why he chose the swastika as the official symbol of the party. According to *Mein Kampf*, Hitler did not want to use the old Reich flag even though he believed the German people should be grateful for having that flag restored to its former glory. But Hitler was also displeased that the Weimar flag was hoisted every day because it represented a reviled republic. Hitler therefore desired a new flag for his future National Socialist regime. Being an artist with a flair for recognizing aesthetic quality, Hitler knew the symbol must be bold enough to transfer into poster form as well; flags would never be enough to carry out his goals of mass propaganda.

Hitler was careful about choosing the color of this new flag. He did not want a white flag because it would remind Germans of the old flag and because the color white lacked passion. Although the color red was

associated with Bolshevism, Hitler remembered attending a Socialist rally and witnessing the manner in which masses of people were swept away.<sup>31</sup> The vibrant red appealed to members of the working class, and it was a symbol of vitality for the Socialist movement. Hitler excelled at understanding how to appeal to the masses, and he utilized this talent to the fullest extent possible.

Hitler decided on black, white, and red for the party flag because these colors are complimentary. The National Socialists opened the door for suggestions on a mark to place on the flag, as Hitler felt that the party membership should have input. Members of youth organizations sent in old, white flags with swastikas on them, a selection that proved to be popular within the party. In the end, the design chosen for the flag was similar to Hitler’s own incarnation. It was submitted by a dentist from Starnberg, identified by Steven Heller as Dr. Friedrich Krohn, a member of Thule. Hitler then decided on the final design for the flag, which would be mostly red with a black swastika inside a white disc in the center of the flag. Hitler ordered armbands to accompany the flag. An almost identical party insignia was designed by a Munich goldsmith named Fuss. Hitler revealed the flag in the summer of 1920, and he stated:

In *red*, we see the social idea of the movement, in *white*, we see the nationalistic idea, in the *swastika*, the mission of the struggle for the victory of the Aryan man, and by the same token, the victory of the idea of creative work, which as such always

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<sup>28</sup> Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolph Hitler*, 70.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Mosse, *The Nationalism of the Masses*, 10.

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<sup>31</sup> An interesting aside to the topic of things Hitler took from the Socialist party is described in Waite’s *The Psychopathic God: Adolph Hitler*, 403. In addition to the red flag, the Nazis called each other comrade, they used the words “Socialist” and “worker” in their party name, and Hitler took May Day as an official Nazi holiday.

had been and always will be anti-Semitic.<sup>32</sup>

By 1920, the swastika had been transformed from an ancient symbol of good fortune to a symbol of anti-Semitism and German nationalism. The new flag aroused the wrath of many people in Western nations even before Hitler and the Nazis committed their worst atrocities. On September 1, 1935, New York City banned the swastika flag from being flown over hotels where German diplomats stayed. Four days later, a mob ripped swastika flags off ships in New York Harbor. While many of the protesters were arrested, the magistrate did not find them at fault because he believed the flag “symbolizes all that is antithetical to American ideals of the God given and inalienable rights of people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”<sup>33</sup> After this incident, Hitler enacted the first set of Nuremberg Laws making the Nazi swastika the official flag of Germany. Of course, Jews in Germany could not fly their new flag because the Nuremberg Laws also took away their citizenship.<sup>34</sup>

From then on, the swastika would never regain its previous status as a symbol revered by people of diverse cultures. After the Second World War ended in 1945, the swastika was banned from Germany as a part of the de-Nazification process. While the swastika is popular in Asian cultures, the West often considers the display of the swastika a crime. It is unlawful in present day Germany to display the swastika. This does not mean, however, that the swastika has disappeared as a symbol of hate. Today, the popularity of Nazi iconography is on the rise, and the swastika is used by neo-Nazi

groups that spread hatred and employ violence against members of racial and ethnic groups they disfavor.<sup>35</sup>

There is some indication that the swastika may be on its way to becoming a benign symbol once again. It is sometimes found on CD labels, or on the bottom of skateboards. If the swastika again becomes a benign symbol, there is a danger that people will forget the evil perpetrated under the swastika flag during the Third Reich. Hopefully, this will not happen because the tragedy of the Holocaust and the horrible crimes against humanity perpetrated by Hitler and his cohorts must not be forgotten.

From its humble beginnings in India and Asia Minor to its rise as the most terrifying symbol of the twentieth century, the swastika has remained steeped in mystery. What would have happened if Schliemann had never discovered the swastika at Troy? Perhaps another symbol would have been selected by the Aryans, considering there is no concrete evidence that the swastika ever belonged to the ancient barbarians. It is possible that Hitler would have found a symbol that was more devastating than the simple swastika. Despite the swastika’s mysterious past, however, the modern swastika unquestionably came to represent horrific events that seemed unimaginable until the 1930’s and 1940’s.

Let the swastika always make us uncomfortable and mournful so the evil of Nazism will never rise again.

Amanda Fanelli  
History Major  
Class of 2004

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<sup>32</sup> Adolph Hitler, Ralph Manheim, trans., *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 494-97.

<sup>33</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: A Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 70.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 71-72.

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<sup>35</sup> Heller, *The Swastika: A Symbol Beyond Redemption?*, 131-32.

## Museum Review

### Dedicated To Great Lakes Sailors: Past, Present, and Future

Does naval history fascinate you? If so, you might enjoy a visit to the Great Lakes Naval Museum in Great Lakes, Illinois. The Great Lakes Naval Museum is a government-owned and operated museum dedicated to telling the story of "boot camp" training in the United States Navy, and the Naval Training Station/Center in Great Lakes, Illinois. A special section of the museum is dedicated to the expanding role of women in the United States Navy.

The Great Lakes Naval Museum is a small museum that occupies a 104-year-old barracks in Building 158 of Camp Barry, the old detention area of the base. The museum offices and storage area, which are off-limits to the general public, occupy the second floor while the exhibits of the museum occupy the first floor of the barracks.

The museum has a growing collection of uniforms, photographs, pictures and other items that detail the life of a sailor in the U.S. Navy. Exhibits range from mannequins wearing period uniforms to depictions of the role of WAVES at Great Lakes during WWII.

You are welcome to watch any of the museum's many videos pertaining to boot camp or base history. In addition, you may browse through old Blue Jackets Manuals and Keels (the yearbook of Great Lakes boot camp).

There are three popular exhibits at the museum to which visitors gravitate. These are the WAVES exhibit, the model of the USS Sable (one of two training carriers out on Lake Michigan during WWII), and the replica of the plane that Senator John

McCain flew during the Vietnam war. The plane used to reside just outside Camp Porter's gate, but it now makes its home on lawn of the west side of the barracks.

The museum is open on Fridays from 1300 – 1600 HRS (1 – 4 PM) and on weekends from 0700 – 1500 HRS (7 AM – 3 PM). Admission is free.

For more information, check the museum website at <http://www.nsgreatlakes.navy.mil/museum/index.html>.

Elizabeth Medina  
MA Candidate  
History

# Poem

## History

I

Consider a weed-  
Indigenous-  
Spreading rampantly on the earth;  
Free and green and growing,  
Covering the ground and reaching up  
To its nourishing, promising sun-  
Not a threat; a plant-  
An offspring of Mother Nature to be  
Preserved.  
Protected.  
A weed-  
Indigenous.

II

Innocence;  
Native Americans  
Torn from their rightful soil-  
Their gardens-  
With nowhere to go,  
No room to grow.  
Like weeds they were destroyed.  
We curse weeds for threatening the flowers;  
They are the innocent ones.  
Innocence.  
The Natives wanted to help  
And did,  
But the White Man took all he needed  
And ripped them from their soil.  
He ripped out their hearts  
And stripped them of their lives-  
Like weeds when they grow too close  
To flowers.  
Flowers are the real poison-  
The White Man's disease,  
Wreaking havoc on the Natives.  
Flowers are the smallpox.  
The White Man planted himself  
And forced the weeds into servitude;  
The weeds had no choice but to obey.  
They became sparse  
And the flowers grew rampantly on the land.

Amy Wilschke  
B.A. in English  
2003

## **Notes On Contributors**

**Joshua Kerr** is a graduate student who is a candidate for a master's degree in history at Roosevelt University. Joshua received his B.A. from Ohio State University

**Bill Hammons** graduated with a B.A. in Political Science from Roosevelt University in 2003.

**Amanda Fanelli** is a history major in the Class of 2004 at Roosevelt University. She plans to attend law school after graduation.

**Elizabeth Medina** is a graduate student who is a candidate for a master's degree in history at Roosevelt University. Elizabeth received her B.A. in history from Columbia College in Missouri. She works part-time on a voluntary basis at the Great Lakes Naval Museum in Great Lakes, Illinois.

**Amy Wilksche** graduated with a B.A. in English from Roosevelt University in 2003.