History of Chicago from Trading Post to Metropolis
External Studies Program | University College

Module 3 Chapter 5
The Decline of the Democratic Machine, 1976 to 1983

Richard J. Daley, as many powerful leaders before him, left no successor. His son, Richard Daley Jr., had not yet established his political claim to succeed his father, and no other politician was strong enough to assume Daley's position in the city and the party.

The day after Daley's funeral, Alderman Wilson Frost, City Council President Pro Tem, and a black, claimed that under existing law he was the new mayor. The other aldermen and the Daley cabinet opposed Frost's claim. They were not about to turn over power to a black, even if he was a machine loyalist. After a great deal of behind the scenes bargaining, a deal was made to split Daley's two jobs. Alderman Michael Bilandic of Daley's 11th ward, a skilled lawyer but non-charismatic politician, was selected as mayor. George Dunne, President of the Cook County Board and a well respected political operative, was named Chairman of the Democratic Party of Cook County. Both men were acceptable to the ward organizations, the bureaucracy, and the economic interests of the city. Both would be willing to allow greater autonomy to the ward organizations and decentralize power within the Democratic machine. The major losers in this rearrangement of power were, of course, the blacks, who had seen Wilson Frost pushed into a lesser post, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the City Council. This snub would not be forgotten by the black community.

After serving as interim mayor, Bilandic was slated as the organizational candidate in the 1977 Democratic primary. His opponents were Roman Pucinski, former Congressman and the leading Polish politician in the city; Edward Hanrahan, former State's Attorney of Cook County; and state Senator Harold Washington, a popular black state legislator and former President of Roosevelt University's Student Senate. Each of these candidates had been part of the Daley machine. Each had solid support among constituencies of the machine. Bilandic won with a bare majority of the votes (50%). Pucinski carried the sizable Polish and ethnic votes (32.7%). Washington won almost all of his support in the black community receiving 10.7% of the city-wide vote. Hanrahan finished a weak last.

Bilandic's accomplishments as mayor included dropping plans for a cross-town expressway, balancing the city budget, keeping labor peace, maintaining public services, and promoting city festivals. However, Bilandic never received the support among blacks that Daley had. He alienated potential black support by opposing busing and any other attempts to integrate education. He opposed plans to place public housing outside of the area where blacks were already densely congregated. Bilandic assumed that the old plantation politics would still work and that blacks would continue to support the Democratic organization regardless of its actions.

Despite weak support among blacks, Bilandic looked like a strong candidate for re-election in 1979. The only opposition seemed to be coming from Jane Byrne, the Consumer Rights Commissioner and former Daley protégé. Byrne stated that Bilandic had "greased" a taxi fare increase despite irregularities in the taxi company figures which he knew about. She questioned both the legality of Bilandic's actions and the truthfulness of his statements. She went public with her accusations. Bilandic took a lie detector test on the issue, and after he passed it, he fired her.

Jane Byrne retaliated by announcing that she would run for mayor against Bilandic and an "evil cabal" of politicians, which included Aldermen Edward Vrdolyak and Edward Burke.

Byrne's candidacy was not taken seriously because she was a woman running in a city that was very conservative. She had no campaign finances to speak of; she had no precinct captains or support within any element of the machine. She was unknown in the black community and had no base of support among white ethnics or liberal reformers.

She was, however, articulate and had connections to the media through her husband, Jay McMullin, a former city hall reporter. She was also in a position to be a lighting rod for all of the anger voters felt toward the machine.

Michael Bilandic's campaign was well planned and financed. All of the elements of the machine were solidly behind him. He offered the voters stability and continued good city services in the Daley tradition. Bilandic was assured of 350,000 solid machine votes. He was an almost certain winner. No political analyst predicted his defeat.

But then it snowed, it snowed, it snowed; and the machine was buried in the snow as was the city of Chicago. The one thing the machine had always promised was that it could deliver city services. It failed. What good was a machine that couldn't work?

The winter of 1978-79 was the worst in Chicago history. By Christmas twenty-one inches of snow had fallen. On New Year's Eve fifteen inches of snow immobilized the city. The snow made the streets impassable. The trains and buses were breaking down continually. On January 12, sixteen more inches of snow fell. There was no visibility. Transportation by car, train or bus was a nightmare. O'Hare Airport was closed.

Bilandic stated that everything was under control, but no one else agreed. The citizens' own experiences, as well as the reports on the T.V., belied his upbeat accounts. The city was angry. It grew angrier when it was discovered that Kenneth Sain, the former Deputy Mayor, had been recently awarded $90,000 to develop a snow removal plan that appeared to be a plagiarized copy of a Roosevelt University master thesis. Also, it was discovered that a Bilandic appointment to the snow command had crime syndicate connections. The CTA announced the closing of ten inner city train stations, thus affecting the black community, so that white suburban commuters would be given priority in going to work. The black voters were furious and promised civil rights law suits if the situation wasn't corrected.

On St. Valentine's Day, Bilandic addressed precinct captains and compared the attacks on him to the crucifixion of Christ, the mass murder of Jews during the Holocaust, the takeover of Eastern Europe by the Communists, and the slavery of blacks. The reactions of many weary, frozen Chicago citizens included outrage, cynicism, and a desire for electoral revenge.

The machine's last hope to save Bilandic and itself was that the cold weather would deter all but machine supporters from voting. The weather on election day was sunny, and Jane Byrne won, beating the Democratic machine in its own primary. She outpolled Bilandic in both the Lake Shore wards and the Northwest side and swamped the machine's candidate in the black wards by a 45,000 vote margin. Bilandic carried only the white southside wards. The general election was an anticlimax, as the machine unified behind Byrne. She won a landslide victory against the Republican candidate, Wallace Johnson, winning 82% of the vote and carrying all but one precinct in the city.

ANSWER QUESTION 10 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)

Jane Byrne was brought up in financially secure circumstances on the city's northwest side and attended an exclusive college, Barat, in Lake Forest, Illinois. She was widowed in 1959 when her husband, a marine pilot, died in a plane crash. After a period of mourning, she got involved in the John F. Kennedy presidential campaign of 1960, where she won the admiration of Mayor Daley. She was eventually appointed Commissioner of Consumer Sales, Weights and Measures. Her office was scandal free, and she made some significant improvements in condominium conversions, taxi safety, and meat grading procedures. In 1975, Daley gave her the title of Co-chairperson of the Democratic Central Committee, a title equal to Daley's but carrying no real power.

The election of Jane Byrne in 1979 represented the climax of the political Cinderella story of Chicago history. If it were a fairy tale the plot might have been: A woman reformer defies the machine and with the support of enraged voters overthrows the "evil cabal" and brings a golden age of prosperity and tranquility to Chicago.

However, in reality, the second part of the story reads more like a classic tragedy than a fairy tale. The good will she had engendered was quickly squandered by her inability to govern effectively. Her administrative appointments seemed to either resign or be fired as soon as they were hired. In her first year, she had three press secretaries and budget directors and had replaced each of her administrative department heads at least once. She was always embroiled in controversy, and her shifts in policy were undercutting her effectiveness. She had replaced the low-keyed Bilandic style with fire and brimstone. She often seemed to be the one, however, who was getting burned.

Jane Byrne also made common cause with her erstwhile opponents, Vrdolyak and Burke, the leaders of the so-called "evil cabal". Fearful of Richard Daley Jr.'s claims on his father's old job of mayor, she replaced Chairman of the Party George Dunne, a Daley ally, with Vrdolyak. She openly opposed the younger Daley's ambitions in the Democratic primary to become State's Attorney. However, Daley defeated Alderman Burke and then defeated Bernard Carey, the incumbent, in the general election. Byrne appeared to suffer a double defeat since she gave covert support to Carey.

Byrne also alienated her former supporters. Blacks felt excluded under the Byrne administration. They were given no real power and were shut out of key appointments. Byrne named Samuel Nolan, a black, as Acting Police Superintendent but failed to pick him for the permanent position, naming a white ethnic instead.

Her policy on school desegregation flip-flopped as she came to oppose the U.S. Office of Civil Rights plan for busing. She instead adopted the white ethnic position of neighborhood schools. She unveiled a scattered sight housing program supported by blacks but then backed away from it, thus further alienating black voters.

Jane Byrne also lost the backing of black voters by not appointing blacks to the school board, by supporting CTA fare increases, by endorsing ward maps that diluted black voting strength, and by numerous other actions that were hostile to black interests.

While Byrne was creating distance between herself and blacks, she was not succeeding in securing the white ethnic vote either. Her base of support was being reduced in other areas as well. Labor saw her as anti-union. She had forced the CTA workers to strike and was viewed as a union buster. She had also reneged on an agreement with the firemen's union to give them a contract. Also, business leaders were concerned that city finances were unstable. The city's bond ratings were continually being lowered. Byrne's style of confrontation also alienated the business community.

It was her conflict with the black community, however, that posed her worst political problems. The black voters were organizing against her in such massive numbers that the balance of power in the city was being changed. A boycott of her summer music festival, Chicago Fest, led to a registration drive in 1982 that was unparalleled in city history. A group called POWER (People Organized for Welfare and Black Politics), a coalition of black civic groups, registered voters at public aid offices and unemployment offices. Black radio stations and ministers urged blacks "to come alive on October 5" and register. Registration campaigns were launched in supermarkets, public housing projects, and fast food stores. Churches even went so far as to refuse free food to the poor if they couldn't show voter registration cards. The drive was so successful that a protest vote by the black electorate almost cost the Republican Governor his re-election.

Between 1979 and 1982 the number of black registrations increased by 127,000. The increase in white voters during the same period was 1,656. Because of these figures, black leaders including Lu Palmer, Jesse Jackson, and Renault Robinson decided to run a black candidate against Jane Byrne. They were joined in this effort by white activist Slim Coleman.

The candidate they chose, Harold Washington, was a reluctant one. He wanted proof that this campaign was going to be a legitimate one. Jane Byrne and the remnants of the machine were still powerful. She could not be underestimated. Her efforts to make Chicago a summer festival were popular. Politicians and community leaders were still dependent on her largesse, and she could use the power of her incumbency to gain favorable press. Her decision to move into the high crime Cabrini Green Housing Project, for example, was popular among both black and whites although some viewed it as only a publicity stunt.

The Election of Harold Washington

Harold Washington's father was a 1st Ward Democratic precinct captain who helped Washington obtain a number of sinecures. Washington himself had been the manager of three of Alderman Ralph Metcalfe's campaigns and was selected to run for the state legislature as a machine candidate. Washington, however, was not a typical machine politician. He was a great orator and person who often placed the concerns of his constituency above those of the machine, a not too common practice among black politicians of the time. Washington had shown independence in the legislature on issues which did not directly affect the Democratic organization. He was a reformer on race issues but a machine loyalist on election reform. Washington was even willing to support the machine candidate against his mentor, the reformer Ralph Metcalfe, in order to protect his political base. Metcalfe victory against the machine opened Washington's eyes to the changing politics of the black wards.

In the primary of 1977, Washington ran for mayor against Bilandic and won large scale black support. The campaign in 1983 would be a more serious effort. Washington, however, had a major political problem to overcome if he was to be a strong candidate for mayor in 1983. Washington had not filed his income tax for four years during the 1970's thus owing the federal government about $500. He served a brief term in prison for this. He also had failed to pay water and phone bills. These problems created an image problem for the candidate.

There were other problems in 1983 for a Washington candidacy. There was the perception among politicians that no black could be elected since the black community was too fragmented between west side and south side wards and between middle-class and lower-class voters. There was the perception that blacks might register but they wouldn't actually vote or wouldn't vote for another black in large enough numbers. Also, Washington was seen only as a spoiler. He was viewed as unable to raise the money needed to run a campaign. Washington was also viewed as unable to pick up any white voters, who were considered crucial to winning.

Jane Byrne's strategy in the 1983 Democratic Primary was to run as citywide candidate on the basis of Byrne for "All Chicago". Her hopes for winning white ethnic votes were based on her opposition to scattered sight housing and busing. She hoped to be viewed as the law and order candidate and used her police superintendent to push her image as a crime fighter. She took the high ground while her white precinct captains warned their constituents about the impact of the black registration on the future of the city. She hoped to win a substantial vote in the black community. She played up her stay in Cabrini Green as well as the fact that she had been a single mother and could, therefore, identify with many black women.

Byrne also remade her image with the help of David Sawyer, a media consultant. She became less confrontational and changed her clothing and her style. She stressed her accomplishments such as the completion of the subway link to O'Hare. She also claimed that she had grown in office and that the turmoil of her administration was merely the natural result of her learning to run the complex city government. Jane Byrne had one more major asset: $10,000,000 campaign war chest.

The third major candidate was Richard Daley Jr., who had a built-in advantage because of the popularity of his father. He, however, was caught in a bind. He needed both black support and white ethnic votes in the southwest sector of the city. Daley tried to balance the differing agendas of these groups by stressing economic concerns and downplaying divisive racial issues. He focused on crime and unemployment as areas he would concentrate his efforts. He attacked Byrne for her large campaign funds, her tax increases, and fiscal mismanagement. He did not attack Washington at all, fearing if he did so black voters would be offended. Daley found another advantage at the point that his campaign seemed to be floundering; both major papers endorsed him for mayor.

Washington started the campaign with a solid base of support, but he needed a large turnout of black voters who would give him landslide support. He needed to convince blacks that he was a serious alternative to Byrne. He needed to win Hispanic voters and about 15% or more of white voters, especially along the lake front.

The turning point in the election came in the debate between the candidates in which Washington proved he could hold his own with the others. He revealed a knowledge of governmental processes and appeared poised and effective. His performance solidified and galvanized his black support, and the election became a crusade for his supporters. At the University of Illinois at Chicago, a massive rally was held for Washington in which he announced that it's "our turn." The blacks, who had for so long been denied the spoils of their voting strength, were now nearly unanimous in their support for his election. He had become more than a candidate, he had become a genuine folk hero among the disenfranchised of the black communities.

As the primary campaign progressed, Byrne strategists realized that her main competition wouldn't be from Daley. Washington was gaining in the polls steadily while Byrne was falling. Edward Vrdolyak, a Byrne backer and Chairman of the Democratic Party, told his precinct captains: ["It's a two person race. It would be the worst day in the history of Chicago if your candidate . . . was not elected. It's a racial thing don't kid yourself. I'm calling on you to save your city, to save your precinct. We're fighting to keep the city the way it is."] When these remarks were reported in the press, Byrne's remaining black support vanished, thus dooming her chances for victory.

Washington won the primary. He received 424,146 votes (37%); Byrne won 338,259 votes (33%); and Daley won 344,721 votes (30%). Washington's total among black voters exceeded 80% while Daley and Byrne split the bulk of the white voters between them. A majority of Hispanic votes went to Byrne. The overwhelming support of black voters plus scattered white and Hispanic votes accounted for Washington's victory in the three way election.

Based on Washington's solid victory, his advisors assumed that white Democratic precinct captains and white voters would support him in the general election as they had supported Byrne in 1979. His staff had failed to make contingency plans for a tough election fight with an obscure Republican candidate, Bernard Epton. They were divided on their campaign strategy. Some called for detente with the old machine; others feared that too much white influence in the campaign would undermine black support for Washington.

The remnants of the white machine were uncomfortable with Washington, not only because he was black but because he had promised to end "patronage perks." The black politicians could not openly oppose Washington, but white precinct captains on the northwest and southwest sides felt an anti-Washington ground swell from their constituents. Only six white committeemen openly supported him while eight actively opposed his election as mayor. The rest quietly supported the Epton candidacy. Epton, who was politically weak, would be forced to allow the white ethnic block of ward bosses autonomy and control over the city government apparatus since there were no Republicans in the City Council to support him.

Another scenario existed for the Democrats: if Epton could be persuaded to abdicate his position on the Republican ballot, a stronger candidate could run against Washington and defeat him. Jane Byrne attempted to replace Epton, but he rejected her bid. She also sought to run as a Socialist Worker candidate since that fringe party had an existing ballot line. That party, too, refused her request. Failing in both of those options, she contemplated an independent try. However, former supporters Edward Vrdolyak, David Sawyer, and others announced they would not support her efforts since she had already lost the primary and she would split the anti-Washington vote.

The campaign, therefore, pitted Washington against Epton in what would be one of the most bitter and divisive elections in Chicago history. It was an election in which party labels meant nothing and race became the litmus test in the campaign. The Republican, Bernard Epton, was originally thought to have little chance of winning. He had been a liberal state representative from Hyde Park who was rated highly by independent voting groups. His campaign strategy was to make Washington's integrity the issue. He revived the matter of Washington's tax convictions and unpaid utility bills. He also accused Washington of being an unscrupulous lawyer and bilking poor clients. Epton provided white voters with a rationale to vote against Washington other than race.

Epton claimed that he would not take the low road politically, but his campaign workers distributed literature that was clearly racist and negative, for example bumper stickers proclaiming "vote right, vote white." His campaign slogan "Epton, before it's too late" was interpreted by many as racist in nature - a charge Epton vigorously denied. The problem for Epton was, that unlike Washington's primary opponents, the only reason he was even considered to be a serious candidate was because many white Chicagoans were uncomfortable with the idea of a black mayor.

Washington's campaign also had its negative side. It focused on Epton's emotional history and his inability to control his temper. Epton's medical records were stolen, and it was revealed that he had been seen for psychiatric evaluation twice. He stated that the visits were precipitated by severe abdominal pain. Washington claimed that Epton would be a figurehead mayor and a pawn of the machine. He also attacked Epton for a conflict of interest while a legislator in voting for insurance bills which would directly benefit Epton's business.

The low point in this dirty campaign came five days before the election. A pamphlet, written by an Epton worker, accused Washington of being arrested for molesting a child. The Chicago Tribune published the story while denying its veracity. There were no police reports or evidence that gave any credence to the story. Washington, however, responded that the fact that the press even printed this slanderous story, concocted by an Epton worker, indicated the depth to which the press and Epton would go to discredit him.

The issue of race was ever present in this campaign. Washington stated that "if his supporters got the feeling that this campaign is going to turn into a race war, then it might turn bitter, evil and angry . . . and some innocent person could wind up dead." This rhetoric generated great fear in the city.

The most famous incident of the campaign was turned into a racial cause celebre. On Palm Sunday, Epton supporters jeered former Vice President Walter Mondale and Washington as they attended services at St. Pascal's Church. The media focused on the racial aspect of the confrontation. The incident made front page news nationally and was used effectively by Washington in his ad campaign. Epton's poor campaigning style and the racial thrust of his supporter's actions gained Washington both sympathy and votes. The greatest reason for Washington's victory was his nearly unanimous support among black voters. He captured every black ward by overwhelming margins, winning 97% of the black vote. He won a majority of the Hispanic vote, and a substantial number of whites cast ballots for him, especially those from liberal lakefront wards. Epton carried the white ethnic wards on the northwest and southwest sides by impressive numbers. The city wide turnout was 82%, one of the highest in the city's history. Washington received 668,176 votes to Epton's 619,926 in this tight election.

The election was a turning point in Chicago history: the first black mayor had been elected. It was also a landmark in another sense. The Democratic machine which had ruled the city for 50 years was in shambles. It had not only lost the primaries of 1979 and 1983, but it was fragmenting into white and black factions. The city now had a mayor whose stated goal was to destroy the machine and its patronage base.

ANSWER QUESTION 11 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)