History of Chicago from Trading Post to Metropolis
External Studies Program | University College

Module 3 Chapter 4
Chicago And Richard J. Daley, 1960 to 1975

Mayor Richard J. Daley

The census of 1970 showed dramatic changes in the city's population, as the chart below demonstrates. 

CHICAGO POPULATION, 1930 AND 1970

Total population	3, 376,438	3,362,947
Percent Foreign born	25	11
Percent second generation	39	19
Total Black	7	33
Total Polish	12	6
Total German	11	3
Total Italian	5	3
Total Spanish	-	7

The total population changed very little over the period of 40 years while the characteristics of the population changed greatly. Most of the new immigrants came from impoverished areas of the United States and from Puerto Rico. They faced a different world than earlier generations of immigrants had. In the 1880's and 1890's, the period of the greatest influx of European immigrants, Chicago was rapidly expanding economically and geographically. Demand for unskilled labor was almost unlimited; both women and children could find jobs except in periods of depression. A shortage of labor existed in the fast growing steel and livestock industries. Businesses actually recruited labor overseas and brought thousands of European peasants to Chicago to work in the mills and stockyards. Housing was a problem, but large areas of empty land still existed in and around Chicago for new houses to be built.

The first large influx of blacks occurred during World War I because of the temporary need for unskilled labor. When the war ended the blacks remained. The same thing happened during World War II. In the 1950's, however, the black population grew while industry stopped expanding, and when the city had been filled with all the housing it could handle, most new housing had to be built in the suburbs. The demand for labor also changed. Increasingly, businesses needed skilled and literate workers. Most of the new immigrants came from the South, but because of conditions in the southern schools few of them had the skills demanded by industry. The nature of unemployment thus differed in the 1950's and 1960's from that in previous times: it resulted from a lack of education rather than from a fluctuation in the business cycle. Unemployment would be long-term and "hard-core" rather than temporary. Thus, more than simple unemployment relief, based on the principle that it will tide the workers over until business conditions improve, was needed. Business conditions might improve, but an untrained or unskilled person might still be unable to land a job. What were needed were expensive, long-term programs to furnish education to the uneducated. Because of the cost, these programs remained politically undesirable except for a brief period during Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. Welfare was much cheaper to manage and therefore remained the chief solution to the problem of poverty.

Martin Luther King put the problem in perspective in 1963 when he observed, "The average Negro is born into want and deprivation. His struggle to escape his circumstances is hindered by color discrimination. He is deprived of normal education. . . . When he seeks opportunity, he is told in effect to lift himself by his own bootstraps, advice which does not take into account the fact that he is barefoot."

Even if blacks held good jobs, and many had moved into management and areas of skilled labor, a severe housing crisis and the effects of white racism made it almost impossible for middle-class blacks to move out of the ghetto. Thus, blacks did not follow the traditional pattern of ethnic mobility in which hard working immigrants succeeded and saved to buy a new house in a better area of town or in the suburbs. Blacks could not because there were many areas of town and many suburbs to which they could not move. Instead, the ghetto expanded slowly block by block as increasingly affluent blacks sought escape from the worst areas. Thus, limited markets in employment and housing worked together to increase the city's racial problem.

A third factor that increased racial tension was the situation in the schools. Enrollment had increased by 146,000 during the 1950's, and almost all of the increase occurred in black areas. Many Chicago schools in all areas of the city had been on double-shifts since the Depression, a situation which reflected the shortage of teachers and classrooms. By 1961, however, the only double-shifts were in black areas.

In September, 1961 a group of black parents charged the Chicago Board of Education with violating the equal protection provision of the 14th Amendment in a suit brought before the United States District Court for Northern Illinois. The Board argued that the segregation of Chicago schools was not a deliberate policy but merely reflected neighborhood housing patterns; in other words, it was de facto segregation, not legal or de jure policy. After hearing the case the court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the black parents had not carried this case through all available state units. Hence, it was not yet time to appeal to the federal judiciary.

A panel headed by University of Chicago sociologist Philip Hauser studied segregation in Chicago schools and issued a report in 1964. The Hauser Panel agreed with the school board that segregation was not a deliberate policy but existed instead as "a by-product of segregated patterns of settlement and housing" developed over a long period of time. Nevertheless, the report concluded, Chicago school authorities had the responsibility to seek an end to de facto segregation. The panel also found that "quality education" was not available in the city schools "to the children who are in greatest need."

Superintendent of Schools Benjamin Willis sought to relieve racial tension by purchasing mobile classrooms, called "Willi's Wagons," for overcrowded black schools. The Woodlawn Organization, a grassroots movement organized late in 1960 to fight Urban Renewal around the University of Chicago, held a mass protest that attracted thousands of teachers and students, but the rally had little effect on school board policy. School policy had replaced housing as the chief racial issue. Benjamin Willis became a symbol of the racial hatreds that flourished, and in one month alone, July 1961, the Human Relations Commission reported 260 serious racial incidents. But, many Chicagoans remained unaware of these disturbances because Chicago newspapers and television stations continued their policy of not reporting such incidents.

ANSWER QUESTION 9 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)

Benjamin Adamowski, the man chiefly responsible for prosecuting police who were caught in home burglaries, faced Richard J. Daley in the 1963 election. Daley had taken most of the force out of the issue by appointing Orlando Wilson as Superintendent of Police. Adamowski was forced to seek other issues and came out against birth control and open housing. Daley, a strong supporter of President Kennedy who had recently urged his party to support open housing legislation, could not contradict his party on that issue; so, he refused to comment. Most Chicagoans knew exactly where he stood on both issues, however, so he had little to lose by remaining silent. Adamowski ran well in Polish and middle-class areas, but statistics showed that the number of middle-class voters was declining rapidly. The economic boom that began early in the 1960's enabled over half a million whites, 19% of the total white population, to move to the suburbs. Working-class white supporters of the Daley organization and blacks did not move out that rapidly. Daley received 56% of the vote in the city and did especially well in black and white working-class wards. As more and more middle-class whites left the city, the Daley organization became more extended. The year 1963 represented the high point in Republican opposition over the next twenty years.

Black voters might support a Democratic mayor along with John F. Kennedy, but black leaders continued their attacks on the schools. The newly organized Coordinating Council of Community Organization triggered school boycotts in 1963 and 1964 and demanded the resignation of Benjamin Willis. Daley charged that Communists headed the drive against Willis and refused to replace him. A few months after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare announced that it was investigating charges of racial discrimination in Chicago schools, and in 1965 the U.S. Office of Education announced that the School Board had violated the Act and therefore $30 million of federal aid would be withheld. The decision stood for only a day, however; Daley got in touch with the Chicago delegation in Congress, and within hours the Office of Education reversed its decision and Chicago received its full allotment of school aid.

Racial tension in the city increased, especially after the huge riot in the Watts section of Los Angeles, which until then was judged one of the best areas of the country for blacks to live, erupted in the summer of 1965. On August 12 of that year, Chicago experienced a major racial disturbance after a fire truck swerved and killed a black girl on the West side. Unsigned leaflets appeared within hours which claimed that a drunken white fireman had been responsible for the accident. Two nights of violence ensued in which 77 blacks were injured in fights with the police. A major race riot had been avoided, however.

Martin Luther King, who had previously dedicated all his efforts to the South, announced in January 1966 that he would move to Chicago and live in a West side slum building in Lawndale. Mayor Daley said King would be welcome in the city. In February Dr. King moved in and asked fellow tenants to join with him in renovating the building. Funds for the project would come from rent withheld from the building's owner. The owner took King to court where Judge James Parsons ruled such a procedure illegal and issued an injunction prohibiting King or any of his associates from entering the apartments. King's first efforts to organize Chicago blacks had failed.

He returned, however, in July 1966 for a massive rally in Soldier's Field. Over 40,000 people attended and demanded the ouster of Benjamin Willis. On July 11, King met Daley in City Hall. After three hours, during which the Mayor asked the civil rights leader for help in putting into effect existing city programs to alleviate discrimination, King emerged to tell the press that he was "not satisfied" because the mayor "doesn't understand the depths and dimensions of the problems we are dealing with."

Trouble began in Lawndale the day following the Daley-King conference. After the fire commissioner ordered that fire hydrants be turned off, rioting broke out followed by three days of looting and shooting. Finally, the National Guard had to be called to quell the rioting. Dr. King returned to the city after canceling a speech in Switzerland and again met with the mayor. The two men set up a citizen's advisory committee to help alleviate racial tension. The committee had little time to get to work before King began a series of open-housing marches through selected white areas of the city. In Marquette Park, almost one thousand police had to be called to protect six hundred marchers from a white mob. King got hit in the head with a rock and announced after the rally that "the people of Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate." Daley blamed the press for the violence because of the publicity given to the demonstrators. He accused King of trying to destroy the Democratic party and said, "We could do well" without outsiders "and we hope they go back to the place they came from." When Martin Luther King did leave the city; the problem of ghetto life remained. Tension eased somewhat after Daley named James Redmond to replace Benjamin Willis in October.

In the spring of 1967, Daley faced re-election. The Republicans had great difficulty finding a candidate and finally settled on John Waner, a heating and air-conditioning contractor with little political experience, who aroused no interest and lost every ward. Daley got 74% of the votes in an election in which few issues were raised or discussed.

The West Side erupted into rioting again in the summer of 1967, but the level of violence did not reach that of the two previous summers. In a further attempt to defuse disturbances, the City Council passed an open occupancy law. But events in Memphis, Tennessee in April 1968 led to the most massive rioting Chicago had yet seen. Rioting broke out in 100 American cities after the assassination of Dr. King. In Chicago, almost immediately after the news was received, high school students began to gather in Garfield Park and move down Madison Street breaking windows and looting. That evening the Mayor asked the governor to call up the National Guard and pleaded with people to "stand-up tonight and protect the city. . . Let's show the United States and the world what Chicago's citizens are made of." It was too late. Angry crowds swept through Lawndale and other black areas burning and looting. Daley toured the riot area by helicopter the next day and expressed surprise at the destruction. "I never believed this could happen here," he said. The National Guard began to restore order. After several days of violence Daley issued his controversial statement on looters: "I told Police Commissioner Conlisk to issue an order to police to shoot to maim or cripple anyone looting any store in our city," he explained. Daley simply could not understand the motivation of the rioters who were mostly young; their rage had not been a part of his experience. The mayor also named a nine man commission to study the cause of the rioting.

A federal judge added to Chicago's woes when he ruled that the Chicago Housing Authority could not receive more federal funds until it began to build public housing in white as well as black areas. Such a policy would destroy Chicago neighborhoods, opposition argued, and hasten the white move to the suburbs. Black politicians also had much to lose with the enforcement of such a policy because spreading black voters throughout Chicago would weaken the concentrated strength of the black voting bloc. The Chicago Housing Authority did nothing to implement the judge's order.

The Democratic National Committee and the arrival of thousands of anti-war demonstrators temporarily displaced racial problems from citizens' minds. Late in April, 6,500 people gathered in the Civic Center to protest the Vietnam War. For some unknown reason, the police broke up the rally with clubs, and many protestors were injured. Apparently the police action had been meant as a signal to anti-war forces throughout the country to stay out of the city. A group of the most radical opponents of the War, the Yippies, had been inviting people to spend the summer in Chicago to celebrate a "Festival of Life" and to upset the workings of the Democratic Convention. One Yippie newspaper urged protestors to "get crazy. . . Cause that's the only way we're gonna beat them. So. . . crazy they can't understand it at all." The mayor and his advisors took the Yippies seriously and expected all kinds of trouble; some Chicagoans even believed that the demonstrators were going to put drugs in their drinking water. Daley prepared for the worst and refused to negotiate with the various anti-war groups which wanted parade permits and permission to sleep in Lincoln Park. Park District administrators believed that the less friendly they were and the fewer concessions they made the fewer demonstrators would come.

The Yippies and other groups began to arrive in mid-August but not in the vast numbers that were expected. Fewer than 10,000 outsiders actually came. Yet, the police acted as if the life of the city had been threatened and drove the demonstrators out of Lincoln Park with clubs and tear gas. The final confrontation came at Balboa and Michigan as thousands of anti-war marchers attempted to walk to the International Amphitheater. The ensuing "police riot", seen on national television, showed the world what the Daley administration thought of the protestors and established the mayor as a symbol of "law and order." The demonstrators had announced that they sought confrontation with the forces of authority, and the Chicago authorities proved eager to oblige.

Late in 1969, another confrontation between police and radicals took place during the "Days of Rage," called that by the Weathermen, a group dedicated to "bringing the war home" by attacking police in the streets. Dozens of demonstrators and police were injured on the North Side and in the Civic Center during battles which many Chicagoans considered totally insane. Black radicals were also active in the city. The Black Panthers, established in California in 1967, had adopted a policy of ambushing police and engaging in open warfare with them. The Chicago Panthers had also set up a breakfast program for children and other community welfare projects, but most public attention, as well as that of the press, was focused on the Panthers' philosophy of violence. In December 1969 a post-midnight raid on Panther headquarters by state attorney's police ended in the death of Fred Hampton, leader of the Chicago chapter. Evidence presented in a series of trials showed that the Panthers had fired only one shot while the police had released a barrage of gunfire. Many in the black community were enraged by the methods employed in the raid. Black resentment led to the defeat of State Attorney Edward Hanrahan in the next election.

The Daley organization named Joseph Bertrand, a black, to run for city treasurer in 1971. Bertrand was the first black to run for city-wide office. The Republican party, which had steadily declined in numbers and power since the candidacy of Benjamin Adamowski in 1963, nominated Richard Friedman for mayor. Friedman was a new style Republican who attempted to generate enthusiasm for his party in Chicago neighborhoods but roused little interest among Daley's working-class supporters. The Democratic organization offered security and jobs for many people: over 8% of the population worked for City Hall in some capacity, and they repaid the organization with their votes. In 1971, Daley got 70% of the total votes, the first time any candidate had received 70% or more of the vote in two consecutive elections. Voter turnout fell significantly to its lowest count since 1935. What the figures indicated was that most Republicans had left the city and those remaining saw little to gain by voting.

Daley's last full term produced no progress in the racial situation, the major problem plaguing Chicago. The ghetto continued to expand block by block, and many whites felt fearful. Several scandals involving aides and associates of the mayor were exposed by United States Attorney James Thompson, who seemed far more interested in pursuing politicians than in bringing to justice all parties involved in the scandal. He got convictions by granting immunity to non-politicians who had been involved in bribery schemes and payoffs; then these guilty parties would testify against the politician. Daley asked, "Where is the justice of this?"

The most prominent cases included Alderman Thomas Keane, leader of the City Council, and Matt Danaher, a neighbor of Daley's and one of his top aides. Keane was convicted in 1974 of mail fraud and conspiracy for selling land to the city at enormous profits. Danahar was convicted of receiving $300,000 in payoffs for zoning changes. Both of these convictions hurt Daley deeply.

In May 1974 the mayor suffered a stroke which kept him out of the city until September. Nevertheless, he recovered enough to seek an unprecedented sixth term in 1975.

The Republicans again had a problem finding a candidate. John Hoellen, one of the few remaining Republicans in the City Council, finally agreed to run. Daley received 75% of the vote; voter turnout was the lowest in 50 years. Hoellen summed up the situation of his party when he concluded that "it's hard to be a Republican in Chicago."

Daley's sixth term lasted less than two years: he died on December 20, 1976 bringing to an end the longest period of service of any mayor in the city's history. He had been the city's father figure, a man who seemed as indestructible as the political machine he had transformed into a seemingly omnipotent organization of uncontested strength.

On the morning of his death, he had maintained his usual busy schedule of activities. He had visited a gym in Alderman Edward Vrdolyak's Tenth Ward and had, on his first attempt, thrown a basketball straight through the hoop. This was not surprising to those who believed in Daley's power to accomplish whatever he wanted.

Daley's political power came from his being Chairman of the Democratic Party as well as mayor. It came, so it seemed, from his ability to obtain the loyalty of precinct captains, labor and business leaders, and community activists. It came from his skill in meeting the desires of ethnic communities for segregated schools and housing, while at that same time meeting the welfare needs in the black residential areas of the city-or so it seemed. It came from delivering the votes on election day and from delivering vital city services every day.

Daley had been successful because he reflected and represented the attitudes of his constituents. Those attitudes were intensely local; people's lives and relations revolved around their jobs and their neighborhoods. Questions of street lights, garbage collections, and the protection of neighborhood schools mattered far more than questions of international affairs.

The machine that Daley perfected, however, was no more indestructible than was the man. The patronage system, which greased the machine, was undermined by a series of court decisions and election losses which were coming with greater and greater frequency. The machine suffered as its leaders were indicted and convicted by a Republican federal attorney, James Thompson, who later became Governor of Illinois. Also, the media attacked the machine for its corruption. The most serious challenge to the machine, however, was the area of race relations. Black voters felt excluded from meaningful power. They felt that they were the ignored element in the Daley coalition and that the machine was not interested in serving their needs.

It is important to remember that the Democratic machine had been built during the days of the Depression when economic insecurity was a way of life for many Chicagoans. The organization then, using the people's money, had provided thousands of temporary jobs. By the 1960's economic insecurity still threatened many people, only by this time welfare checks provided some security for many residents while city jobs provided security for thousands of others. In brief, patronage and welfare, supported to a large extent by federal aid, provided the Democratic organization with its basic support. In actual numbers, the population chart changed little between 1930 and 1975, but increasingly the city became a home for new immigrants like Southern blacks, Appalachia whites, Puerto Ricans, and the elderly. The first three groups suffered from poverty, lack of education, and unfamiliarity with city life. In other words, their situation reflected to a great degree that of earlier immigrant groups. The world had changed greatly since 1914, the last year of massive immigration from Europe. Demand for skilled labor had declined rapidly while the need for better education had greatly increased. Moving out of the impoverished areas of the city would not be easy for these groups. Racial prejudice, completely changed the picture for black Americans and Puerto Ricans. White ethnics could learn to speak English and could then move anywhere they chose in the city or suburbs. The new immigrants could not. The Democratic organization did not deal with that problem; it probably did not know how to provide leadership in the area of race relations. Thus, though quiet in the 1970's, the underlying resentments and hatreds continued to build.

Summary

1. Race replaced ethnicity as the major source of conflict in Chicago.

2. Daley scored well in elections after 1963 because most Republicans had left the city.

3. The Daley organization appealed to the security consciousness of Chicago citizens.

4. The mayor did not really understand the reasons for black violence in the 1960's and did not know how to deal with it.

5. The Democratic organization began to be less effective toward the end of the Daley era.