RU AccessScheduleRU OnlineDirectoryContact Us
   Future Students Current Students Parents Alumni Faculty & Staff
Print-friendly version
 

History of Chicago from Trading Post to Metropolis
External Studies Program | University College

Module 3 Chapter 3
Race and Politics, 1940 to 1959

 Image of Chicago skyline

The New Deal changed the role of government in American life. Since 1787, most Americans had looked upon the national government as primarily concerned with the protection of freedom. After 1933, its major function was to ensure economic security for millions of Americans. Social Security and unemployment compensation were now part of the American system, and a precedent had been set with relief projects that had provided millions of temporary jobs during the Depression, making the federal government the employer of last resort.

On the local level, for a while, it looked as if the Republican party had been eliminated from Chicago. But as the election of 1939 showed, the party retained an appeal with many voters, especially those interested in economy in government and "cleaning-up the relief rolls." The Republicans also appealed to the anti-machine elements in the city. Dwight Green, the 1939 candidate, went on to become governor of Illinois in 1940.

The war had little effect on Chicago politics. In the mayoral election of 1943, the Republican party continued its battle against illegal payrollers, gangsters, and machine politics. Governor Green selected his state finance director, George B. McKibben, a Chicago lawyer, to run against Mayor Kelly. McKibben attacked the "disgraceful conditions" of the schools, and blasted the "racketeers and hoodlums given free rein in the city" by the Democrats. He promised to drive the gangsters out of the liquor business, though he assured voters he was not a prohibitionist. "Syndicate thugs and gunmen" had kept Kelly in power for ten years, McKibben claimed, and he would do all he could to drive them out of town. Kelly ignored all charges made against him and being a poor speaker, maintained silence during the campaign. The Democratic party stressed the dangers of changing administrations in the middle of the war. On the few occasions Kelly did speak he raised the theme of patriotism. "I believe we have a job here in building up morale and making the public realize we are in a war," he told a women's group, "I'm running for this office to finish the job and also finish a civic job."

Republican orators raised a new issue in the campaign, the growing danger of "socialism" in the country. "We tolerate a socialist national administration which is ruthless in its grab for power," one Republican candidate charged. "You have its counterpart here in the Kelly-Nash machine, an arrogant and selfish crowd of politicians."

In the closing days of the campaign, Governor Green stood on a sound truck in front of City Hall and shouted that Kelly had gone out of his way to protect the mobsters who were running the city. McKibben stated that syndicate "gunmen" controlled many of the labor unions in the city and were literally getting away with murder. When asked by a reporter to respond to these charges, Kelly replied that he "would not get down in the gutter" with his opponents.

One of the principal Democratic speakers was Richard J. Daley, minority leader of the state senate. Daley stressed budget issues and charged that the Green administration had already spent $75 million more than the Democratic administration of Henry Horner. Daley also claimed Democrats had been responsible for the reduction in the sales tax that had taken place the year before. Mayor Kelly explained why he had remained so quiet during the campaign on the day before the election: "I have been reluctant during this campaign to burden the people with any unnecessary discussion that involved politics because of the weight of the war on everyone's mind." George McKibben also had the war on his mind: "Chicago's sons in the battle front will be watching the home front on election day. In your hands is the opportunity to make this a city worthy of their sacrifice."

The results of the election were 54.6% for Kelly to 45.7% for McKibben. In the city council, the Republicans increased their total from five to nine. In its analysis of the results, the Chicago Tribune, which refused to criticize Kelly because of his longtime friendship with owner Colonel Robert McCormick, theorized that the Republicans had lost because they had not been vehement enough in their criticism of the New Deal. The "derelictions of the New Deal" were what Chicagoans wanted to hear about. "The people were looking for a champion of their rights and liberties, for someone who would express their disgust of all who share the blame for regimentation and needless deprivation. They looked in vain." Read Mayer and Wade on pages 368-371 for an overview of the effects of WWII on Chicago.

As was true during the First World War, thousands of blacks were attracted by employment opportunities in war-related industries, and approximately 65,000 blacks entered Chicago between 1941 and 1945, adding to the overcrowded conditions in the black ghetto. Schools were already bad, and the rapid influx of students, mainly from the South where there was virtually no education for blacks, increased the problems.

Many Chicagoans were frightened by a race riot in Detroit in June, 1943. President Roosevelt was forced to call out federal troops to quell the disturbance. Mayor Kelly, in a move to prevent a similar occurrence, appointed a Mayor's Committee on Race Relations to discuss problems and recommend solutions. Later, the Committee became the Chicago Commission on Human Relations. A Fair Employment Practice Commission had been established by Roosevelt, and it attempted to ensure that blacks were not discriminated against in defense industries and that they received equal pay for equal work. Congress, however, killed the F.E.P.C. when the war ended. The Commission had done a remarkable job as the Chicago Human Relations Commission pointed out. "With those workers from minority groups solidly set in these plants, their seniority guarded and protected under the collective bargaining agreements, and with a limited number of workers returning with seniority rights, these stable situations represent a new factor in the employment situation in Chicago."

But, as the Commission also pointed out, the housing situation and unemployment were the major areas of conflict. Chicago in 1946 was "a seething cauldron," according to the Commission, and closer to a major race riot than at any time since 1919. Americanism rather than race became the central issue in the county elections of 1946, the only elections in which Richard J. Daley was defeated. Daley ran for sheriff in a campaign throughout which the Republicans denounced the Democrats for having sold "the allies down the river", at Yalta. The Cold War anti-Russian feelings of Chicago's many Eastern Europeans lead to a protest vote against the Democratic Party's foreign policy and local Democrats suffered the consequences of this protest. The defeats incurred by the Kelly-Nash candidates in the county elections led to an internal fight in the machine.

Though Kelly wanted to run again in 1947, others led by Jacob Arvey, a west side alderman, felt the party needed a new image. A blue-ribbon candidate would attract voters even if the Republicans retained the East European vote and combined it with their traditional "good government" vote. Apparently, Avery decided that a "machine" image would hurt a candidate more than anything else. So, the Democrats chose Martin H. Kennelly, owner of a moving and storage business, who had declared himself independent of the Democratic machine and whose favorite theme in the campaign was "running neighborhood spirit." He had been active on the Chicago Crime Commission and had a citywide reputation for honesty and integrity.

The Republicans decided to continue the campaign against alleged Democratic bungling of foreign policy, an issue which retained its emotion-laden power even in local elections. Charges of "communism in government" also reverberated throughout the campaign. Russell W. Root, the Republican candidate and former assistant state's attorney, told a radio audience that if elected he would use his influence to elect a Republican President in 1948 and work against a third World War. Root charged that the Democrats were the "war party," and that the rest of the United States was looking at the Chicago mayoral race as a referendum on war. A victory for the Republicans would be a signal that America did not want a continuation of the "war, waste, and broken promises" brought by the Democrats.

Mayor Kelly made several appearances before party regulars in which he assured them they could wholeheartedly support Kennelly because "Kennelly was not a reformer." Arvey's strategy proved successful and Kennelly defeated Root handily 58% to 42%. In his inaugural address, the new mayor assured voters that he would develop new hiring practices and improve Civil Service because he did not believe in the spoils system "to the victor belongs greater responsibility," he affirmed, not greater spoils. The Republicans gained 11 seats in the city council, nevertheless, and they now had 17 to the Democrats' 33.

ANSWER QUESTIONS 5 AND 6 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)

Racial questions ruled during Kennelly's first term. As the black population grew from 277,731 in 1940 to 492,265 in 1950, the physical area of the ghetto expanded only very slowly. As the Chicago Plan Commission pointed out in 1945, 300,000 people were living in an area large enough to support only 225,000 without terrible overcrowding. Severe competition for housing resulted, and as the ghetto slowly expanded white communities responded hysterically. The Human Relations Commission reported that "each incident, no matter how small, carried seeds of possible explosion."

The Chicago Housing Authority, created to oversee development of public housing, followed a policy of "open occupancy" that led to several incidents. At least nine major riots occurred in Chicago between 1947 and 1951, but most were not reported in the press because the editors followed a deliberate policy of not reporting racial strife. They followed this policy because they felt newspaper coverage would only attract "outsiders" to the neighborhood and the situation might be exploited.

The first incident occurred at the Airport Homes on 60th and Kedzie. After a black army veteran moved in, whites overturned cars and threw rocks at police during a month long series of confrontations that finally drove the veteran out. On August 12, 1947 the C.H.A. moved a black family into the Fernwood Park project on the southwest side. A white mob set several houses on fire and threw stones at passing blacks. Over one thousand police had to be called into the area to quell the disorder. The Commission on Human Relations reported that the Fernwood Park incident had been stopped just short of it turning into a major riot because blacks had begun to attack white motorists driving through black areas.

Late in 1949 a riot occurred on Peoria Street because a white union organizer had a black guest in his home. A small crowd that gathered in front of the home had to be dispersed, and the guest had to receive a police escort out of the neighborhood. Two nights later 400 people threatened to burn the house down and police were called again. Gangs of white youths ran through the streets attacking blacks, Jews, and anyone who looked like a University of Chicago student. After 5 days of mob violence the police finally decided to intervene, and the gangs were finally dispersed.

Blacks, especially middle-class blacks, found themselves in a perplexing dilemma. The median black income rose from $2,500 in 1945 to over $3,700 in 1953, and though still less than the $5,400 white median income, it gave blacks an opportunity to seek new housing; but the area they were allowed to buy into was extremely limited because of the solid defense of white neighborhoods. Chicago politicians did little to ease the way out of the dilemma and in many cases used racial fears to hold on to their own power.

The county elections of 1950 went badly for the Chicago organization. The slating of Captain Daniel Gilbert, reportedly the richest police captain of all time, for sheriff dismayed many voters. Gilbert as chief investigator of the state attorney's staff, had openly consorted with underworld figures; during his twenty years in office not one of the 188 gangland slayings had been solved. Over 1,000 other murders in the county remained unsolved. Gilbert received only 44% of the votes and became the first Democrat to lose the city since 1928.

Martin Kennelly faced re-election in 1951. His administration had remained relatively above scandal, but he had angered many black voters by his stand on the Lake Meadows apartment project. In 1948, he opposed a city council amendment that would have prohibited racial discrimination in renting the apartments. Kennelly failed to speak out during any of the racial incidents that took place while he was mayor. He did, however, crack down on gambling and policy operations in the black ghetto right before the election while gambling operations in other areas of the city remained undisturbed. The Republican candidate, Robert Z. Hunter, appealed to black voters and held a huge rally on the eve of the election. Hunter actually received a majority of the black vote but it was not enough; Kennelly did well in other areas of the city and received 56.1% of the total vote. Shortly after his re-election, however, a major racial incident took place in a Chicago suburb, and many people feared it would spark a similar incident in Chicago.

In June, 1951 a black veteran attempted to move into an apartment in Cicero. The police stood in the doorway and tried to stop him while the mayor warned that he would not be responsible for the veteran's safety. After an unsuccessful attempt to keep him out, the police returned later that night and beat him up and ran him out of town. A short time later, a federal judge issued an injunction against the Cicero police enjoining them from further violence. The veteran moved back in only to be greeted by a mob that burned his apartment as the police stood idly by. Governor Adlai Stevenson finally declared martial law and sent in the national guard. About a year later a Cicero grand jury indicted the veteran, the owner of the apartment building, and an attorney for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for conspiring to destroy property. The jury refused to indict the Cicero police or any member of the mob. These indictments were dropped after an uproar of protests, and a federal grand jury finally indicted the mayor of Cicero and several policemen for failure to obey an injection. Two policemen ultimately were fired, but the incident symbolized the depths of racial hatred in the community.

In August of 1953, racial conflicts flared into the open at the Trumball Park Homes. Again, the Chicago Housing Authority attempted to move a black family into a public housing project, and again mobs gathered, fires were set, and rocks were thrown. Two white organizations, the South Deering Improvement Association and the National Citizen Protective Association, held meetings and organized a campaign of terror that lasted for nine months. By that time the C.H.A. had moved more black families into the project. The campaign of terror, which included bomb-throwing, window breaking, and threatening telephone calls, had failed; yet the black families had to have constant police protection for more than a year. The policy of open occupancy pursued by the C.H.A. led to several more violent confrontations. Obviously, other changes, especially in racial attitudes, were necessary before the problem of housing could be solved, but no one in a leadership position addressed the problem of racism; most politicians seemed to wish that it would go away, and Mayor Kennelly simply ignored it.

The Kennelly administration faced further challenges when a Chicago Crime Commission report in 1952 estimated that at least ten percent of Chicago's 8,000 policemen were taking bribes. Alderman Robert Merriam offered a proposal to the City Council that would have required all policemen to fill out a financial questionnaire but the Mayor and the Democratic party fought the proposal and it was easily defeated. The report on the link between police and crime led to no action; this was another issue politicians ignored.

Kennelly wanted to run for a third term in 1955 and he felt that his record of achievement deserved the support of his party. Some Democrats had other ideas, however.

Kennelly had made many enemies while mayor, especially in his attempt to clean up Civil Service. Most seriously he had alienated black Democratic leaders like Representative William Dawson, commander of the black forces in the city. Kennelly's crack-down on gambling and vice had been ordered without Dawson's approval and made the Congressman extremely angry. Other politicians sought someone who understood their needs more than Kennelly who seemed bent on actually reforming some areas of city government. Richard J. Daley, elected Cook County Democratic Chairman in 1953 appeared to be the man to satisfy these two groups.

ANSWER QUESTION 7 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)

Daley wanted to become mayor in 1955, but so did Kennelly and Benjamin Adamowski, a former state legislator and the first Pole to seek the office. After a bitter primary fight, Daley emerged the victor but with only 49% of the votes. Kennelly got 35%, and Adamowski 16%, including 69% of the Polish vote. Daley was elected by a coalition of black votes and white ethnic votes (except for the Poles.) Kennelly did well in the richer areas of the city and in Irish precincts where he got 45% of the votes.

In the regular election Daley faced Robert C. Merriam a former Democrat and son of the 1911 Republican mayoral candidate. Merriam served as 5th Ward alderman (Hyde Park) and led an investigation of crime syndicate influences in city government. By 1955, Merriam had bolted the Democratic party because of what he considered its refusal to deal with corruption.

Corruption became a central issue in the campaign. Merriam charged that the Democratic candidate for City Clerk, Ben Becker, had accepted bribes in return for granting zoning permits while serving as an alderman. Witnesses came forward to testify to the truth of these charges, and Daley dumped Becker and replaced him with John C. Marcin, a Pole, who had been on the ticket as candidate for City Treasurer. In Marcin's place, Daley named Morris B. Sacks, who had been the Kennelly candidate for the office. These moves increased Daley's support among two weak links in the machine, the Poles and the Kennelly Democrats.

Merriam continued his attack on corruption and charged that if the Democrats stayed in power Chicago would again be a "wide-open-city." He accused Daley of "bossism" and said that no man should hold the office of county chairman and mayor at the same time. Daley promised that he would resign his position as Democratic county chairman after he was elected, a promise he later ignored.

Daley refused to answer Merriam's charges of crime syndicate influence in the city and preferred instead to say that he would make the city "a more beautiful place to live." Alderman Thomas Keane publicized the fact that Merriam was divorced and had remarried a woman with "part-Negro" blood. Both Benjamin Adamowski and Mayor Kennelly sat out the election, refusing to support their party, and a year later Adamowski was a Republican candidate for state's attorney.

On election day, Chicago voters gave 55% of their votes to Richard J. Daley, a man who Robert Merriam said was "the front man for a pack of jackals who had been feeding off the city for the past 24 years." Merriam did best in moderate and high income wards in the city, while Daley swept the black wards and working-class wards--a coalition not unlike that which had supported William Hale Thompson, only this time it was Democratic not Republican. This was, of course, the same coalition that had supported the Kelly-Nash organization during the Depression, and with certain exceptions, as when ethnic candidates of a particular group, like Adamowski, took votes from the coalition in a primary, it remained the basis of Daley's support throughout his career. As the table below shows, Democratic support remained fairly constant except in times of extreme emergency like 1935.

DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE IN MAYORAL ELECTION

1931 - 59%
1935 - 76%
1939 - 56%
1943 - 55%
1947 - 58%
1951 - 56%
1955 - 55%

Daley's instinct for power was built on the traditional support of Chicago working-class voters for the Democratic party; genes had little to do with that support, history on the other hand did. Daley now had power; the question was what would he do with it?

ANSWER QUESTION 8 IN THE REPLY BOOKLET. (Provided after registering for courses through the External Studies Program.)

One of Daley's major priorities was to stop the City Council investigation of crime syndicate activities, and this he did quite easily. The Kennelly administration had begun planning for many civic improvement projects, such as the construction of Chicago's expressways, and during Daley's first term many of these projects came to fruition. By 1959, Daley had succeeded in winning the approval of many downtown civic and business leaders because of his ability to get funds for projects such as McCormick Place and his emphasis on rejuvenating the downtown area.

The Republican party lost many of its supporters to the suburbs during this period. Timothy Sheehan, a former Congressman, reluctantly accepted the Republican nomination to oppose Daley in 1959. No one else wanted that opportunity. No issues were raised and Daley swept to victory, 71% to 29% with only 60% of the electorate bothering to turn out, a decline of 9% since 1955. A pattern was established that developed throughout Daley's five terms: the lower the turnout, the higher the percentage of voters for Daley.

Summary

1. Racial problems stirred the city in the period following World War II.

2. Martin J. Kennelly ran as a blue-ribbon candidate for mayor and promised some reforms. The nature of Democratic politics in the city made reform very difficult.

3. Few politicians offered any leadership on the race question.

4. Housing was the greatest problem the city faced. Chicago Housing Authority proposals and actions did little to ease that problem.

5. Richard J. Daley was elected mayor by a coalition of black and ethnic voters.

University College | External Studies | History of Chicago | Chapter Index

© 2006, Roosevelt University, All Rights Reserved
Chicago  430 S. Michigan Ave, Chicago, IL 60605 | 312-341-3500
Schaumburg 1400 N. Roosevelt Blvd, Schaumburg, IL 60173 | 847-619-7300